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In The Day of the Jackal, Frederick Forsyth's 1971 novel,' French
authorities learned that a professional assassin of unknown identity
had been hired by disgruntled former army officers to assassinate
President Charles DeGaulle. The Minister of the Interior called the
heads of all French law enforcement agencies to an emergency meet-
ing. These officials quickly realized that until they could discover
who the killer was, there was little they could do to frustrate his
plan. The President had already refused to alter his schedule or
behavior; to do so in the face of a death-threat, he insisted, would
be beneath his dignity and an affront to the nation's.
A detective, praised by his agency head as the best in France, was
summoned and instructed to identify and apprehend the assassin. He
was given extraordinary authority to accomplish this task, and he
was told to report daily to the assembled agency heads. The detective
quickly learned of the assassin's false identities. On several occasions
the Jackal's capture seemed certain, yet each time the quarry man-
aged to slip out of the trap.
Eventually, the detective suggested that someone might be leaking
information about the investigation. This possibility was spurned by
I F. FoisYTm, ThE DAY OF THE JACKAL (1971).
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the agency heads as a puerile attempt to excuse failure. A day or
two later, the detective confronted them, insisting that someone who
had been attending these secret daily briefings was the source of the
leak.
When challenged to substantiate this accusation, the detective played
a tape recording. The officials heard a woman place a phone call
and repeat information about the assassin's location that the detective
had reported only one day earlier. When the tape ended, the Deputy
Chief of the Presidential Security Corps rose, ashen-faced, admitted
that the woman was a "friend" who was "staying with me at the
present time," and stumbled from the room.
It is easy to imagine the admiration and gratitude with which the
remaining chiefs then regarded the detective. (It helped that the Dep-
uty Chief had not been particularly popular with his colleagues.)
Then the Minister asked the detective how he knew to tap the Deputy
Chief's home telephone. The detective responded, "I didn't, so last
night I tapped all your telephones." '2
The sudden change in mood presumably precipitated by this an-
nouncement mirrors, in many ways, the prevailing American attitudes
about electronic surveillance. We expect the police to act promptly
and effectively to combat crime, but we insist that in doing so they
respect and protect the right to privacy that is guaranteed by the
Fourth Amendment3 and enshrined in our values as an essential com-
ponent of individual freedom and dignity. Wiretapping and eaves-
dropping are among the most effective investigative techniques
available to combat crime. To many observers, however, surreptitious
monitoring of private conversations conjures images of Nazi Ger-
many, the Soviet Union, and fictional equivalents. 4 To strike the
2 Id. at 347.
"Fourth Amendment" is capitalized throughout this Article, despite the
dictates of A Uniform System of Citation, Rule 8 (14th ed. 1986), at Professor
Fishman's request.
, The Watergate scandal of the early 1970s should suffice to destroy any
illusions that the United States is somehow inherently immune from the misuse
of these techniques. The scandal began in 1971 when individuals working for the
re-election of President Nixon bugged the Democratic Party's offices in Washing-
ton, D.C. The President and his closest advisors conspired to cover-up the in-
volvement of their political associates. At the same time, Nixon had been secretly
recording many of his private conversations-including conversations proving his
own participation in the conspiracy to obstruct the investigation into the Watergate
[Vol. 22:1
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proper balance, to permit the police to tap and bug under appro-
priate circumstances, while protecting the right to privacy against
police overreaching, has been one of the greatest challenges our legal
system has confronted in the past half-century.5
For the last twenty years, law enforcement use of wiretapping and
eavesdropping has been regulated by Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.6 Congress enacted Title III
break-in. For an excellent overview of "Watergate" and its impact, See T.H.
W E, BREACH OF FArm, ch. 5-8 (1975).
5 In 1928, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment was inappli-
cable to wiretapping unless government officials had physically invaded the defen-
dant's premises. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928). Congress
eventually responded by enacting section 605 of the Federal Communications Act
of 1934, ch. 652, § 605, 48 Stat. 1103 (1934) (current version at 47 U.S.C. § 605
(1982 & Supp. III 1985)), which provided that "no person not being authorized
by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish [any aspect
of the communication]." The Supreme Court, while standing by Olmstead, sub-
sequently held that § 605 applied to intrastate as well as interstate communications,
Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321, 329 (1939), and prohibited wiretapping by
state and federal officers as well as by private persons, Benanti v. United States,
355 U.S. 96, 100 (1957) (state officers); Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379,
383 (1937) (federal officers), appeal after remand and trial, 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
The Court also applied the Olmstead rule limiting Fourth Amendment protec-
tion to physical trespass in several opinions relating to bugging (electronic eaves-
dropping on face-to-face conversations). In Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S.
129 (1942), federal agents overheard conversations between defendants Goldman
and Schulman by pressing a listening device against the wall adjoining Shulman's
office. Since there had been no physical trespass into Schulman's premises, the
Court reasoned that no search had occurred. Id. at 134-35. In Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961), however, the Court held that an illegal search had
occurred when police drove a microphone several inches into a party wall of the
suspect's house. In Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158 (1964) (facts related in
Clinton v. Virginia, 204 Va. 275, 130 S.E.2d 437 (1963)), the Court arrived at
the same conclusion where the microphone's penetration was only thumbtack deep.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court abandoned the trespass doctrine of Olm0stead
and Goldman. In Katz v. United States, 387 U.S. 347, 353 (1967), the Court held
that the surreptitious interception of private communications constituted a search
under the Fourth Amendment regardless of whether investigators had intruded
into any constitutionally protected "area." Soon thereafter, Congress enacted the
legislation discussed at infra note 6.
6 Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197, 211 (1968) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)) [hereinafter Title Il1]. The legis-
lation was controversial when enacted. See S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess. 161-85, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD mN. NEws 2112, 222244
(separate dissenting views of Sens. Long, Hart, Burdick and Fong). For criticism
of the statutes, see Schwartz, The Legitimization of Electronic Eavesdropping: The
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with at least four specific goals in mind. First, in permitting inves-
tigators to obtain court authorization to wiretap or eavesdrop, it
sought to provide law enforcement officials with a much-needed
weapon in their fight against crime, particularly organized crime. 7
Second, it sought to safeguard the privacy of wire and oral com-
munications.8 Third, Congress endeavored to satisfy the procedural
and substantive requirements previously enunciated by the United
States Supreme Court in Berger v. New York9 and Katz v. United
Politics of 'Law and Order', 67 MICH. L. REv. 455 (1969); Spritzer, Electronic
Surveillance by Leave of the Magistrate: The Case in Opposition, 118 U. PA. L.
REv. 169 (1969). Although the controversy has dampened somewhat, it has not
abated completely. When Congress enacted Title III, supra, it also created a
Commission to study existing electornic surveillance law, see Title III, supra, §
804, 82 Stat. 197, 223 (1968) which, after extensive hearings and studies, in 1976
issued a lengthy report. See NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REviEw OF FEJDERAL
AND STATE LAWS RELATING TO WIRETAPPING AND ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE,
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE REPORT (1976) [hereinafter NWC REPORT]. Although
the Commission endorsed Title III, a substantial number of commissioners con-
cluded that Title III had failed to serve the purposes it was intended to further,
and called for its repeal. Id. at 177, 179-92 (minority report of Sen. Abourezk,
Reps. Kastenmeier and Seilberling, and Prof. Westin); id. at 213-17 (separate
statement of Prof. Westin). See also H. SCHWARTZ, TAPs, Buos, AND FOOLING
THE PEOPLE (1977) (criticism of Title III and the way it has been used); Margolis,
Human Rights Commentator, 50 CONN. B.J. 559 (1976) (also criticizing Title III).
Many may agree with one district court judge that "[w]e are becoming a society
that must exist in constant hazard from official snooping," and that "[w]hatever
incidental good flows from this invasion of privacy is submerged by the growing
appearance of police surveillance so typical of totalitarian states." United States
v. Kline, 366 F. Supp. 994, 996-97 (D.D.C. 1973) (Gesell, J.).
7 Title III, supra note 6, § 801(c), 82 Stat. 197, 211-12; S. REP. No. 1097,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. 70, 89, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws
2112, 2157, 2177. One scholar urges that the metaphor "war on crime" carries
within it an inherent denigration of individual liberties. See Schwartz, supra note
6, at 43-45.
1 Title III, supra note 6, § 801(b), 82 Stat. 197, 211; S. Rm,. No. 1097, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. 89, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CoNo. & ADMIN. NEWS 2112,
2117. Hence, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) prohibits all interceptions
of communications not expressly permitted by the statute.
9 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (reversal of conviction for conspiracy to bribe a public
official where conviction secured by invalid court-ordered eavesdrop). Berger deline-
ated the constitutional prerequisites to the issuance of an eavesdropping warrant: (1)
there must be probable cause to believe that a particular offense has been or is
being committed; (2) the warrant must particularly describe the conversations to be
intercepted; (3) eavesdropping must be limited in duration; (4) extensions may be
granted only on a new showing of probable cause; (5) eavesdropping must terminate
once the sought-for evidence has been obtained; (6) there must be a showing of
[Vol. 22:1
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States0 as constitutional prerequisites to lawful court-authorized in-
terception of private communications." Finally, it attempted to "de-
fine on a uniform basis the circumstances and conditions under which
the interception of wire and oral communications may be author-
ized.'7 2
exigent circumstances to justify the lack of notice; and (7) there must be a return
on the warrant. Id. at 54-60.
Wo 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (reversal of conviction for interstate transmission of wa-
gering information where conviction secured with a wiretap that was a properly
circumscribed surveillance, but was not duly authorized by a magistrate). Katz reaf-
firmed the principles of Berger, and also found that a neutral predetermination of
the scope of the search by a magistrate is a "constitutional precondition" of dec-
tronic surveillance. Id. at 358-59. For a discussion of the effect of Berger and Katz
on prior law, see Dash, Katz-Variations on a Theme by Berger, 17 CAT. U.L.
RIv. 296 (1968). See also discussion at supra note 5.
" See S. Rm. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 74-75, reprinted in 1968 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADmIN. Nuvs 2112, 2161-62. Application of the Fourth Amend-
ment to nontrespassory interception of communications carries with it, however,
procedural and conceptual problems which do not arise in situations involving
traditional search warrant litigation. First, the nature and scope of a search au-
thorized by a traditional search warrant is substantially different than that au-
thorized by an interception order. A traditional search warrant application must
establish probable cause to believe that particularly described items will be found
in a specified premises; an interception application, by contrast, must establish
probable cause to believe that particularly described communications, which have
not yet taken place, will be seized over a specified telephone or in a specified
location. The traditional warrant authorizes a single, overt entry and search of
the premises, and no second entry or search is permitted unless a new warrant,
supported by a new showing of probable cause, is obtained; an interception order
may authorize a series of surreptitious intrusions for several days or weeks on a
single showing of proximate cause.
In addition to defining the nature and scope of the search, a second problem
arises in defining the scope of authorized police conduct, and the remedy to be
applied in the event of unauthorized conduct. When police execute a traditional
search warrant, they usually know when they see an object whether it falls within
the gambit of items subject to seizure. If the police seize more than a search
warrant authorizes them to, the non-authorized items are inadmissible at trial and
must be returned to the owner. Agents executing a wiretap or eavesdrop, by
contrast, often cannot know whether a conversation constitutes the sought-for
evidence until it has been heard in its entirety. Since restoration of conversational
privacy is not possible, what remedy, if any, may be imposed to deter excessive
overhearing?
12 Title III, supra note 6, § 801(b), 82 Stat. 197, 211. See also S. REP. No.
1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, 89, reprinted in 1968 U.S CODE CONG. & ADUM.
NEws 2112, 2153, 2177. States are authorized either to adopt no legislation allow-
ing eavesdropping or to enact statutes at least as restrictive as the federal statute.
18 U.S.C. § 2516(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess. 98-99, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.Un. Naws 2112, 2187.
19871
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The requirements for a Title III interception order are outlined in
some detail in Part II of this Article, but in essence, such an order
is a specialized form of search warrant. As such, it must comply
with the warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment, which directs that
"no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the person or thing to be seized.' 3 Accordingly, one of the
preconditions to an interception order included in Title III is that
investigators submit an application to a judge establishing probable
cause to believe that evidence of specified criminal conduct could be
obtained by monitoring conversations on the particular telephone to
be tapped or in the particular location to be bugged. 14
The preparation of an application for an interception order is a
time-consuming process, and properly so, since the decision to employ
so intrusive an investigative technique should not be too easily or
too lightly made. Inevitably, however, occasions arise in which in-
vestigators have to act promptly, or risk losing the opportunity to
act effectively. Anticipating such occasions, Congress included within
Title III a provision which permits, in certain limited situations, the
interception of communications before a judge issues, or receives an
application for, a court order authorizing such interceptions. 5 This
"emergency surveillance" provision was intended as a statutory anal-
ogy to the "exigent circumstances" doctrine, 16 which holds that where
the need for prompt action is particularly compelling, law enforce-
ment officials may conduct a warrantless search, seizure or arrest in
situations normally requiring a warrant.
Eighteen years later, Congress added a new provision to Title III
which empowers federal officials, in certain circumstances, to obtain
a court order permitting them to tap or bug the conversations of a
suspect named in the order regardless of what telephone or location
the suspect might choose to use on a particular day. 17 The addition
Twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia have enacted such statutes. See
C. FIsmAN, WRETAPPNG AND EAVESDROPPING § 5 (1978 & Supp. 1987).
, U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
" 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b)(ii) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
15 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
'6 S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 104, reprinted in 1968 U.S. Con
CONG. & ADimN. NEWS 2112, 2193.
" 18 U.S.C. § 2518(11) (Supp. IV 1986). The addition of this section was
[Vol. 22:1
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of this "roving intercept" provision was a major development in
Title III because it waived the otherwise rigid requirement that an
intercept order must "particularly describe" the phone to be tapped
or location to be bugged.
One might expect that federal investigators would frequently invoke
the broad authority that Congress seems to have given them through
the emergency surveillance and roving intercept provisions, but they
have not. As of the summer of 1987, the Justice Department had
not once utilized the roving intercept provision that was added to
Title III in 1986,18 and had employed the Title III emergency sur-
veillance provision only a handful of times in twenty years. 19 The
Department has apparently used the emergency surveillance provision
only in life-threatening situations, and has been reluctant to apply it
in a more straight-forward evidence gathering context."
To some extent, this reluctance is understandable: the procedures
mandated in the emergency surveillance provision are cumbersome,2 1
its vagueness raises questions of constitutional validity, and the vague-
ness of the constitutional "exigent circumstances" doctrine on which
it is based creates even more uncertainty.m On the other hand, some
may criticize the Justice Department's caution as excessive. It is prob-
ably impossible to determine how often an unwillingness to invoke
the provision has hampered the effective use of wiretapping and
eavesdropping. The need to invoke the emergency surveillance and
roving intercept provisions is likely to increase in the future, however,
part of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508,
100 Stat. 1848 [hereinafter ECPA].
18 I have been so informed by knowledgeable Department officials.
19 See infra note 20 and accompanying text.
See Wiretap Amendments, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Criminal
Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 7 (1980) (testimony of Phillip B. Heymann, then Assistant Attorney General
in charge of the Criminal Division); id. at 11 (prepared statement of Mr. Hey-
mann). In October of 1985 and again in June of 1987, I was informed by Justice
Department officials who review all Title III applications before they are submitted
to the Attorney General or his designee that this is still the case. For a more
detailed discussion of Justice Department policy, see infra notes 181-209 and
accompanying text.
21 For a discussion of Justice Department procedures, see infra notes 181-209
and accompanying text.
For a discussion of the vagaries of the doctrine's development in Supreme
Court decisions, see infra notes 32-72 and accompanying text.
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as advances in communications technology provide criminals with
greater opportunities for evasive tactics.23
This Article will examine these provisions in their constitutional
and statutory contexts. Part I briefly reviews basic Fourth Amend-
ment case law regulating searches and seizures, summarizes the exi-
gent circumstances doctrine, and discusses the applicability of that
doctrine to electronic surveillance of communications. Part II outlines
Title III's requirements for a "standard" (non-emergency, non-roving)
interception order, including what the application and order must
contain, and how such an order must be executed. Part III studies
the emergency surveillance provision of Title III and reviews Justice
Department policies and practices in implementing that provision.
Part IV analyzes the new roving intercept provision, discusses its
constitutionality, and looks at some practical problems that may arise
when obtaining and using an intercept order authorized under it.
Part V briefly examines how three other Western democracies, Can-
ada, Israel and West Germany, regulate emergency surveillance, and
compares their rules to our own. Part VI offers an evaluation of the
current system of regulation, and some proposed reforms.
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND WARRANTLIESS INTERCEPTION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
A. The Warrant Requirement
For example, several recent court opinions have noted that narcotics viol-
ators are using telephone "beepers" or "pagers"; doing so permits them to stay
in telephone contact with coconspirators while minimizing the risk of wiretapping.
See, e.g., United States v. Cox, 752 F.2d 741, 744 (1st Cir. 1985) (DEA agent
called the beeper number and the suspect returned the call); United States v.
Marin-Buitrago, 734 F.2d 889, 891 (2d Cir. 1985) (one of the grounds given by
a DEA agent to substantiate probable cause for a warrant was the use of a beeper
in premises where tenants did not have a telephone); United States v. Ginsberg,
758 F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 1985) (officers found on suspect a beeper and access
number to another suspect's beeper); United States v. Williams, 753 F.2d 329,
334 (4th Cir. 1985) (beeper found in suspect's possession at arrest); United States
v. Antone, 753 F.2d 1301, 1305 (5th Cir. 1985) (evidence of beeper use helped
sustain guilty plea). Similarly, numerous cases have arisen recently in which the
suspects have used telex or other forms of "electronic mail" in their criminal
schemes. See, e.g., Howitt, Court Pries into E-Mail, Infoworld, July 15, 1985, at
26; Iranian Accused of Conspiring to Export Military Equipment, Baltimore Sun,
June 28, 1985, at 1C, col. 1; Raytown Couple Indicted, Kansas City Times, Feb.
28, 1985, at A-1, col. 1.
[Vol. 22:1
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The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, and imposes strict requirements on the warrants that may be
issued for reasonable searches and seizures.? Under the "Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule," if evidence is obtained in a manner
which violates a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, the prose-
cutor is not permitted to use that evidence at trial to establish that
defendant's guilt. Searches conducted without a warrant have been
found "presumptively unreasonable" by the Supreme Court, 6 and
the fruits of those searches are generally subjected to the exclusionary
rule.
The fourth amendment provides, in full
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
21 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (first case in which the
Court applied the rule in a federal prosecution). See also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 655 (1961) (holding that the exclusionary rule is binding on state courts
through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment). The exclusionary
rule is intended to deter law enforcement officials from conducting unlawful searches
and seizures by depriving them of the incentive to do so. Nix v. Williams, 467
U-S. 431, 441-47 (1984); United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 275-76 (1978);
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433,
458 n.35 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974); Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. at 657-68. In Mapp, the Court emphasized other purposes for the
rule as well, including "the imperative of judicial integrity," id. at 659 (quoting
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960)), but more recently the Court
has stressed the deterrent rationale as the primary justification for the rule. See
cases cited above.
- United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 717 (1984). See also Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (finding that warrantless searches "are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment .... "). The Supreme Court has stated
that the purpose of the warrant requirement
is to allow a neutral judicial officer to assess whether the police have
probable cause to make an arrest or conduct a search.... [Tihe
placement of this checkpoint between the Government and the citizen
implicitly acknowledges that an 'officer engaged in the often compet-
itive enterprise of ferreting out crime' may lack sufficient objectivity
to weigh correctly the strength of the evidence supporting the contem-
plated action against the individual's interests in protecting his own
liberty and the privacy of his home.
Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 212 (1981) (citations omitted) (quoting
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)).
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Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has recognized several exceptions
to the warrant requirement. For example, a warrant usually is not
required to authorize a search of an automobile, or containers found
therein, so long as probable cause exists to believe that the search
will reveal evidence of criminal activity. Also, if a person is lawfully
arrested, the police may conduct a search incident to that arrest.
Such a search can include the arrestee himself,18 personal property
on or in the possession of the arrestee, 29 and the area "within [the]
immediate control" of the arrestee at the time of the arrest.?0 A
search conducted pursuant to consent is also excepted from the war-
rant requirement.31 Finally, the Court has recognized an exception
that is very important in the warrantless interception of communi-
cations, the "exigent circumstances" exception, which is discussed
below.
7 United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823-24 (1982) (container found inside
automobile); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970) (automobile).
23 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 232-36 (1973); Gustafson v. Flor-
ida, 414 U.S. 260, 266 (1973).
9 Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 643-47 (1983) (stationhouse search of
arrestee's shoulder bag following street arrest); United States v. Edwards, 415
U.S. 800, 802 (1974) (removal of paint chips from arrestee's clothing ten hours
after his arrest for burglary).
30 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 457-62 (1981) (where arrest occurs while
or immediately after an arrestee is inside an automobile, a police officer may, as
a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of
the automobile, and may examine the contents of any containers found within
the passenger compartment); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (where
arrest occurs within a home or other premises, search incident must be limited to
the "area from within which [the arrestee] might gain possession of a weapon or
destructible evidence"). Even in the absence of probable cause either to arrest or
to search, in certain circumstances the police are permitted to conduct a limited
search of a suspect or his automobile. The Supreme Court has held on several
occasions that an officer may stop (seize) and frisk (search) a suspect whom the
officer reasonably believes is armed and dangerous, provided that the search is
carefully limited to a frisk for weapons. Pennsylvania v. Mimnims, 434 U.S. 106,
112 (1977); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 24-27 (1968). See also Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983)
(permitting a limited search of passenger compartment for weapons in stop-and-
frisk situation); Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259, 261 (1982) (upholding "in-
ventory" search of impounded car in the absence of a warrant, exigent circum-
stances and, apparently, probable cause).
3' Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (stolen checks found
in trunk of car found admissible where owner voluntarily told police to "go
ahead" if they wanted to search).
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B. The "'Eigent Circumstances" Doctrine
The Supreme Court has long recognized that in some circumstances
'the exigencies of the situation' make the needs of law enforcement
so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment." 3 2 Such situations are divisible into
three general categories: life-threatening exigencies, hot pursuit, and
preservation of evidence from destruction.
1. Life-Threatening Exigencies. The most obvious "exigent cir-
cumstance" exists where police have reason to believe that someone
inside the premises in question is in immediate danger of death or
permanent injury. "mhe Fourth Amendment does not bar police
officers from making warrantless entries and searches when they rea-
sonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid," 33
and the case law indicates that this rule applies whether the danger
is criminal or noncriminal in origin.3 Because such entries are lawful,
evidence discovered in plain view as a result of such entries may
lawfully be seized and is admissible at trial.31
2. Hot Pursuit. A second exigent circumstance arises when police
are in "hot pursuit" of a suspect who flees into a building and hides
there. Assuming probable cause exists to arrest the suspect, the police
-1 Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978) (invalidating an Arizona "mur-
der scene exception" to the warrant requirement, and holding that a possible
homicide does not inevitably create an emergency situation); Chimel v. California,
395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (recognizing exception to search for weapon or destruc-
tible evidence, but finding a search beyond this unreasonable); Warden v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294, 298-300 (1967) (exception recognized when officers in "hot pur-
suit"); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966) (recognizing exception
to prevent destruction of evidence); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-
15 (1948) (recognizing exception, but finding only inconvenience and slight delay
would have resulted from obtaining warrant); McDonald v. United States, 335
U.S. 451, 456 (1948) (recognizing exception, but finding insufficient exigency).
33 Mincey, 437 U.S. at 392 (citing numerous state and lower federal court
decisions). Cf. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655-56 (1984) (recognizing an
analogous "public safety" exception to the rule, enunciated in Miranda v. Ari-
zona, 384 U.S. 436, 436 (1966), that various warnings must precede custodial
interrogation before statements obtained as a result of such interrogation are
admissible at trial).
-' See generally W. LAFAvE, 2 SEARcH AND SEzURE § 6.6, at 467-73 (1978
& Supp. 1986).
31 Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 293-95 (1984) (dictum); Mincey, 437
U.S. at 392-93 (dictum).
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may enter the premises without a warrant.3 Once inside, they may
search for the suspect, for other individuals who might endanger the
police or who might themselves be endangered, and for weapons37
Evidence discovered during such a search may lawfully be seized and
is admissible at tria 35
3. Preserving Evidence from Destruction. The Supreme Court has
frequently acknowledged that where the delay necessary to obtain a
warrant threatens the destruction of evidence, a warrantless seizure,
entry or search is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment?9 The
Court's decisions provide only general guidance, however, as to when
warrantless action to prevent the destruction of evidence is lawful.
There is great uncertainty regarding the degree of emergency or ex-
igency necessary to excuse the absence of a warrant.
To date, there has been only one case, Schmerber v. California,40
in which a majority of the Supreme Court has upheld a warrantless
search on preservation-of-evidence grounds. 4' Since the "search" in
16 United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43 (1976); Warden v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967).
37 Hayden, 387 U.S. at 298-99.
M' Id. at 300-10.
"I Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966). See also Welsh v.
Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753-54 (1984); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 718
(1984); Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 293-94 (1984); Mincey v. Arizona,
437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 35 (1970); Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15 (1948).
, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). The defendant, Schmerber, had been involved in a
traffic collision under circumstances establishing probable cause that he was driving
while intoxicated. After taking Schmerber to a hospital, the arresting officer di-
rected a doctor to remove a blood sample which confirmed that Schmerber was
intoxicated. Under the circumstances, the Court concluded "there was no time to
seek out a magistrate and secure a warrant." Id. at 771. The Court found that
it was reasonable for the officer to have the doctor take a blood sample since
Schmerber had refused to submit to a breathalyzer test, and that the procedure
was conducted in a reasonable manner. Id.
4 A case which is relevant but provides no binding precedent is Ker v. Cal-
ifornia, 374 U.S. 23 (1963), in which police, acting without a search warrant,
obtained a key to the home of a drug suspect, entered without first knocking and
giving notice, and seized additional contraband. The state courts had upheld the
action, reasoning that entry without notice was justified under the circumstances
because to give notice would have afforded the suspect time to destroy the drugs
that police had reason to believe were inside. Four Justices of the Supreme Court
agreed with the state court reasoning, and four Justices dissented. Justice Harlan,
the remaining voice, decided to uphold the state court decision, but on the ground
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that case was the taking of a blood sample to determine the presence
of alcohol, it differs from most evidence-preservation warrantless
searches in at least two significant respects: the blood-alcohol evidence
was extremely evanescent, 42 and the "place to be searched" was the
body of a defendant already in custody." Thus, Schmerber offers
little direct guidance in determining the degree of exigency required
to justify the nonwarrant entry into someone's home, office or other
location to search for less inherently evanescent evidence.
Although the Court has rejected several governmental claims of
adequate exigency, these decisions are not very enlightening as to
the degree of exigency that would have sufficed. In Johnson v.
United States,44 the Court found insufficient exigency to justify a
warrantless search of a hotel room, from which the aroma of burn-
ing opium was emanating, because "[n]o evidence or contraband
was threatened with removal or destruction, except perhaps the fumes
which we suppose in time would disappear. ' 4 In Vale v. Louisiana,"5
the Court arrived at the same result, explaining that "[t]he goods
ultimately seized were not in the process of destruction. Nor were
they about to be removed from the jurisdiction."'' In Mincey v.
that state searches should be judged by more flexible Fourteenth Amendment
"concepts of fundamental fairness," not by federal Fourth Amendment standards.
Id. at 46 (Harlan, J., concurring in the result). Hence, the Ker decision provides
no binding precedent for the scope of the evidence-preservation exigent circum-
stances doctrine.
,- Given the rate at which the body eliminates alcohol from the system, it
was a virtual certainty in Schmerber that the evidence would have been lost if
the officer had waited until he obtained a warrant. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770.
7 The Court stated that "absent an emergency, no less [than a search warrant)
could be required where intrusions into the human body are concerned," id., but
does not elaborate on whether more should be required, or the effect of custody.
- 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
45 Id. at 15. This was a curious comment, since, at the very least, the opium
being smoked was in the process of being destroyed when the officers knocked
on the door.
399 U.S. 30 (1970).
'7 Id. at 35 (citations omitted). The dissenting opinion notes that none of the
decisions cited by the majority support the proposition that contraband must be
"in the process of destruction" to invoke the exigent circumstances doctrine, but
only that it must be "threatened with removal or destruction." Id. at 39 (Black,
J., joined by Burger, C.J., dissenting). Police officers arrested Vale just outside
his home under circumstances establishing probable cause that he had narcotics
inside the home. Concerned that someone inside might have seen the arrest and
would destroy the drugs before they could obtain a warrant, the officers made a
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Arizona,4 the Court condemned a warrantless search of a homicide
scene because "[tihere was no indication that evidence would be
lost, destroyed, or removed during the time required to obtain a
warrant. "49
Three decisions handed down in 1984 reinforced the existence of
the exception, but did little to dissipate the uncertainty of its scope.
Suppressing evidence of arson found after a residential fire in Mich-
igan v. Clifford," the Court nevertheless -commented that warrant-
less entry and search "may [under different circumstances] be nec-
essary to preserve evidence from intentional or accidental
destruction." ' 5' In United States v. Karo5 2 the Court held that mon-
itoring an electronic tracking device inside someone's home nor-
mally must be authorized by a warrant but that "if truly exigent
cursory inspection of the home to determine if anyone was present. No one was
inside, but the mother and brother of the arrested party returned home within
minutes. The officers then proceeded to search the house, and seized a quantity
of narcotics. Id. at 32-33.
The Supreme Court concluded that the search was illegal. "We decline to hold
that an arrest on the street can provide its own 'exigent circumstance' so as to
justify a warrantless search of the arrestee's house." Id. at 35. It is not altogether
clear, however, whether the Court was condemning the initial entry into the house
to determine whether it was occupied, or only the more detailed search which
resulted in the discovery of the narcotics. See id. at 34. Further, the Court
apparently assumed that the police had had probable cause for a warrant to search
the house even before they set up their surveillance of it. Id. at 35.
" 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
49 Id. at 394. Officers went to Mincey's apartment to arrest him for a previous
sale of narcotics. A shootout ensued, and a police officer was killed. Over the
next four days, homicide detectives returned to the apartment on several occasions
to search every corner of it. The Court rejected the state's contention that an
implicit "homicide scene" exception existed to the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement. Id. at 395. "Except for the fact that the offense under investigation
was a homicide," the Court observed; "there were no exigent circumstances in
this case .... " Id. at 394. The Court took note of the fact that a police guard
at the apartment precluded the removal or destruction of evidence, and that "there
was no suggestion that a search warrant could not easily and conveniently have
been obtained." Id. at 394.
o 464 U.S. 287 (1984).
Id. at 293 n.4 (quoting Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 510 (1978)). The
Court held that "where a homeowner has made a reasonable effort to secure his
fire-damaged home after the blaze has been extinguished and the fire and police
units have left the scene, . . . a subsequent post-fire search must be conducted
pursuant to a warrant, consent, or the identification of some new exigency." Id.
at 297.
52 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
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circumstances exist no warrant is required under general Fourth
Amendment principles. ' 53 Finally, in Welsh v. Wisconsin,4 the Court
concluded that "mere similarity to other cases involving the im-
minent destruction of evidence is not sufficient" when the offense
being investigated is so minor as to be classified as noncriminal."
Thus, while the Court has firmly established the exception to the
warrant requirement for evidence preservation in exigent circum-
stances, it has done little to define the scope of that exception. It
is unclear whether the prosecution must prove that the evidence
was "threatened with removal or destruction, ' 5 6 that it was "in
5I Id. at 718. In Karo, drug enforcement agents installed a "beeper" in a
drum of chemicals in the hope of locating a clandestine laboratory. The Court
held that no warrant was needed to justify the installation of the beeper, id. at
713, but that, barring exigent circumstances, a warrant was required before law
enforcement officials could monitor the beeper once its host object has been taken
into a private residence. Karo is discussed at infra notes 84, 85, 258, 288-292 and
accompanying text. For a detailed analysis of the case, see Fishman, Electronic
Tracking Devices and the Fourth Amendment: Knotts, Karo, and the Questions
Still Unanswered, 34 CATE. U.L. Rnv. 277-395 (1985).
', 466 U.S. 740 (1984).
" Id. at 753-54. Arriving at the scene shortly after the defendant had driven
his car off the road into an open field, police officers were told by a witness
that the driver appeared to have been "very inebriated or very sick," id. at 742,
but had walked away. The police checked the car's registration, obtained the
driver's home address, entered the home when the driver's stepdaughter answered
the door, and found him lying naked in his bedroom. Id. at 742-43. They arrested
him and took him to the police station where he refused to take a breath-analysis
test. According to state law, the arrestee's operating privileges would be revoked
for 60 days, and his refusal to take the test admissible against him in a criminal
proceeding for driving while intoxicated, unless he could show that the refusal
was reasonable. Id. at 746-47.
The defendant maintained that his refusal was reasonable because he was un-
lawfully placed under arrest subsequent to an illegal search. The trial court dis-
agreed, but the appellate court reversed, finding a Fourth Amendment violation.
Id. The state supreme court reversed, finding exigent circumstances in the need
for hot pursuit of a suspect, the need to prevent physical harm to the offender
and the public, and the need to prevent destruction of evidence (the blood-alcohol
level). Id. at 748.
The U.S. Supreme Court found no hot pursuit or threat of harm. It assumed
that there was an exigent circumstance due to the threat of destruction of evidence,
id. at 754, but also found that "an important factor to be considered when
determining whether any exigency exists is the gravity of the underlying offense
for which the arrest is being made." Id. at 753. Noting that Wisconsin classified
an initial offense for driving while intoxicated as noncriminal, the Court concluded
that the warrantless entry into Welsh's home was indeed illegal.
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15 (1948).
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the process of destruction" or "about to be moved,' 5 7 or only
that there is an "indication that evidence would be lost, destroyed
or removed," -8 even assuming that the offense under investigation
is serious enough.5 9
Nonetheless, we may make some general observations regarding
the conditions under which the exigent circumstances doctrine may
be invoked. The decisions cited above, "general Fourth Amendment
principles, 60 and decisions of lower courts" '6 ' suggest the following
requirements: 62
1. Exigencies aside, there must be grounds for a warrant.
This means that there must be probable cause to believe
that particular evidence will be found in a particular
premises.6 3
2. The circumstances must be sufficiently exigent. The
factors to be considered in assessing exigency include:
a. the gravity of the underlying offense; 61
b. whether the evidence is readily susceptible to re-
moval or destruction;6 5
-' Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 35 (1970).
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978).
Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753-54 (1984). See also United States v.
United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 318 (1972) (holding that a warrant was
required to wiretap or eavesdrop upon a domestic group or organization for
national security purposes, but also recognizing that the exceptions to the warrant
requirement "serve the legitimate needs of law enforcement officers to protect
their own well-being and preserve evidence from destruction"); United States v.
Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 52 (1951) (rejecting a warrantless search, in part because
there "was no question of ... imminent destruction, removal or concealment of
the property intended to be seized"); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451,
455 (1948) (reaching the same result because, among other reasons, there was no
"property in the process of destruction" or "likely to be destroyed").
60 "If truly exigent circumstances exist no warrant is required under general
Fourth Amendment principles." United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 718 (1984).
61 Perhaps the most detailed discussion of the issue appears in United States
v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262, 268-69 (3d Cir. 1973).
'2 The analysis that follows is based in significant part on W. LAFAvE, supra
note 34, § 6.5, at 439-50.
, Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 291-95 (1984); Vale v. Louisiana, 399
U.S. 30, 34 (1970) (discussed supra notes 50-51); Johnson v. United States, 333
U.S. 10, 13 (1948).
£4 Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753-54 (1984) (discussed supra note 59).
"I Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 40 (1963) (plurality opinion, discussed supra
note 41); United States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262, 268-270 (3d Cir. 1973).
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c. The amount of time necessary to obtain a war-
rant; 
s
d. whether the officers have a valid basis to believe
that the evidence is likely to be removed or destroyed
while a warrant is being obtained;6
e. whether the police failed to take advantage of an
earlier opportunity to obtain a warrant, or earlier sought
a warrant and were turned down for lack of probable
cause;6s
L whether the exigency was unnecessarily provoked by
the police themselves;69 and
g. -whether the police attempted to obtain a warrant
at the earliest opportunity.70
3. The measures taken to meet the exigency must be
inherently reasonable under the circumstances .7
4. The search or seizure in question must be conducted
in a reasonable manner.2
C. Applicability of the "'Exigent Circumstances" Doctrine to
Electronic Surveillance
For many years, the Fourth Amendment was found inapplicable
to electronic surveillance unless government officials had physically
trespassed on the defendant's premises.Y In Katz v. United States,74
" Rubin, 474 F.2d at 269-70.
'Whether to require "probable cause" or a lesser standard, such as "rea-
sonable suspicion," remains the most difficult question. See, e.g., United States
v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 718 n.5 (1984) (expressly reserving the question of whether
reasonable suspicion may be sufficient to justify a warrant for monitoring a
beeper). With regard to interception of communications, however, there will almost
always be probable cause to believe that the evidence sought will be unavailable
by the time a warrant is obtained.
- G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 358-59 (1977); United
States v. Gardner, 553 F.2d 946, 948 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Delguyd,
542 F.2d 346, 350-51 (6th Cir. 1976). See W. LAFAvE, supra note 34, § 6.5, at
44041.
69 W. LAFAvE, supra note 34, § 6.5, at 442.
70 Id. at 441.
71 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966).
Id. at 771.
See supra note 5.
, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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however, the Supreme Court held that the use of an electronic
device to overhear a private conversation constituted a search re-
gardless of whether the authorities had trespassed onto the target's
property or premises to install the device.7 Thus, the interception
of private communications is now subject to the requirements and
restrictions imposed by the Fourth Amendment. 76
Some dicta in the Katz case suggested that the exceptions to the
warrant requirement might never apply to electronic surveillance, 77
and some commentators have expressed doubts about the consti-
tutionality of intercepting communications without a warrant under
any circumstances. 71 It is clear, however, that the difficulties the
Court spoke of were of a practical, rather than a constitutional,
nature.79 For example, in its discussion of the life-threatening cir-
cumstances exception, the Court did not find the exception inap-
plicable per se; rather, it assumed that "there seems little likelihood
that electronic surveillance would be a realistic possibility in a sit-
uation so fraught with urgency."80 In addition, the Court did not
even address the most relevant exigent circumstances exception,
preservation of evidence. 81 The Katz dicta is, therefore, an insuf-
ficient basis for the argument that exigent warrantless surveillance
71 Id. at 353 (expressly overruling earlier decisions supporting the "trespass
doctrine"). In Katz, law enforcement officials placed an eavesdropping device on
the outside of a public telephone booth, which enabled them to overhear Katz
relating gambling information into the telephone. Id. at 348.
76 Id. at 353-54. The Katz Court found that the warrantless voice recordings
did not comply with "constitutional standards," id. at 354, even though the agents
acted "with restraint," id at 356, because the restraint was not imposed by a
judicial officer, id., and none of the recognized exceptions to the warrant require-
ment where shown, id. at 357-58.
" "It is difficult to imagine how any of those exceptions [to the warrant
requirement] could ever apply to the sort of search and seizure involved in this
case." Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.
78 NWC REPoRT, supra note 6, at 15-16 (1976) (acknowledging such doubts
while not agreeing with them).
79 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357-58 (1967) (discussing the search
incident to arrest, hot pursuit, life-threatening and consent search exceptions to
the warrant requirement).
80 Id. at 358 n.21. The Court was wrong in its prediction: the Justice De-
partment reports that it has used such surveillance successfully in several instances.
See infra note 172.
"1 The Court had recognized this exception at least 19 years earlier in Johnson
v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15 (1948). See also supra notes 39-59 and accom-
panying text (authority for the exception).
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is inherently unconstitutional. Further, it may reasonably be con-
strued to mean that the Court will apply the exigent circumstances
doctrine to electronic surveillance as a matter of law if an appro-
priate case comes before it.
In subsequent decisions, the Court has said nothing to suggest
that exigent warrantless interceptions are inherently unconstitu-
tional. 82 Indeed, in United States v. Karo,83 a case involving elec-
tronic tracking devices, a form of surveillance concededly less
intrusive than the interception of communications, the Court seem-
ingly went out of its way to comment that "if truly exigent cir-
cumstances exist no warrant is required under general Fourth
Amendment principles."84 It seems logical to conclude, therefore,
that exigent warrantless electronic surveillance is constitutional so
long as it complies with the same Fourth Amendment standards
against which exigent warrantless physical searches are measured.
Applying those standards in the context of life-threatening exigen-
cies presents little difficulty.
Application of the exigent circumstances doctrine to electronic
surveillance in the context of preserving evidence from destruction,
on the other hand, presents at least two major problems. First, the
standards governing exigent physical searches and seizures are as
yet only vaguely developed." It is obviously problematic to apply
"standards" to a new situation when the standards themselves are
ill-defined. Second, an electronic "search" for and "seizure" of a
private conversation bears so little resemblence to a physical search
and seizure that analogies from the law governing the latter apply
imperfectly and awkwardly to the former.8
In United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 308 (1972) the
Court, while rejecting the Government's claim that it had implicit constitutional
power to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance against a domestic group for
national security purposes, observed that the established exceptions to the warrant
requirement, "few in number and carefully delineated, * . . serve the legitimate
needs of law enforcement officers to protect their own well-being and preserve
evidence from destruction." The reference to the preservation of evidence was
dictum, but is at least consistent with the constitutionality of warrantless surveil-
lance.
- 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
91 Id. at 718. The Court's comment was completely gratuitous; the government
had not raised an exigent circumstances argument in its briefs or during oral
argument.
See supra notes 32-72 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 11.
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Let us assume, for example, that the Supreme Court holds that
a warrantless physical search to preserve evidence from destruction
is constitutionally permissible only when the crime under investi-
gation is a felony8 and the evidence in question was "in the pro-
cess of destruction." 88 Such a standard would place a near-impos-
sible burden on law enforcement officials in the physical search
context. Arguably, however, it would do little to limit warrantless
interception of communications. This is so because these intercep-
tions are most frequently used to detect felonies89 and the evidence
sought by such surveillance is inherently evanescent-it must be
recorded immediately or lost for good. Considerations of public
policy, and perhaps the Fourth Amendment, demand a distinct
standard of exigency in the context of electronic surveillance that
will take these factors into account.
A variety of factors seem relevant in defining a practicable stan-
dard. The nature of the crime under investigation should be con-
sidered.9 The importance, in the context of the investigation, of
the communications that may be reasonably expected to occur be-
fore an application for a court order may be submitted and acted
upon is of crucial relevance, as is the likelihood that substantially
similar conversations will occur after a court order is obtained. 9'
-' Such a holding might result from an extension of the ideas in Welsh v.
Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753-54 (1984). See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying
text.
This requirement might be derived from a narrow reading of Vale v. Louis-
iana, 399 U.S. 30, 35 (1970). See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text,
9 See infra note 91.
90 Congress has chosen to permit court-authorized wiretapping and eavesdrop.
ping only to investigate certain designated felonies. See 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1),(2)
(1982 & Supp. III 1985).
91 In an investigation of a continuing crime, such as narcotics trafficking,
grambling, or fencing, it is often reasonable to assume that even if the details of
a particular transaction are missed while a court order is being sought, substan-
tially similar transactions will continue to occur after an order is issued. In such
situations, no exigency exists that would justify warrantless surveillance. This type
of investigation comprises the overwhelming majority of applications made pur-
suant to Title III and corresponding state statutes.
In 1984, for example, federal judges issued 289 wiretapping or eavesdropping
orders, and state judges issued 512. Of this total of 801 interception orders, 483
(60.3% of the total) were issued to investigate narcotics, in 186 (23.2%), the most
serious offense was gambling, in 53 (6.6%), the main offense was racketeering.
REPORT ON APPLICATIONS FOR ORDERs AuTHORING OR APPROVINO THE INTERCEP-
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The delineation of such standards is appropriately a legislative rather
than a judicial function.
Parts I1 and IV of this Article examine how Congress has at-
tempted to regulate warrantless surveillance through the emergency
surveillance and roving interception provisions of Title III. To put
these provisions in context, however, it is first necessary to review
how Title III regulates court-ordered interception of communica-
tions.
H. TTLE III: PEtR EQUISrrS TO COURT-ORDERED SURVEILLANCE
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
196892 empowers law enforcement officials to seek, and judges to
issue, court orders authorizing the interception 3 of "wire commu-
nications," 94 "oral communications,"" and, since 1986, "electronic
-Io oF WIE oR ORAL CoMMNCATioNs roR 1984 3-4 (1985) (Administrative
Office of the United States Courts).
On the other hand, if investigators have been tracking the progress of a par-
ticular major transaction and learn that the deal will be finalized in a phone call
or meeting before a court order can be obtained, a true exigency exists which
should justify warrantless surveillance for a limited period of time while an in-
terception application is being prepared. Justice Department officials, however,
doubt the need for nonwarrant emergency even in these circumstances. See infra
note 208 and accompanying text.
'z Title I1, supra note 6.
Title HI defines "intercept" as "the aural or other acquisition of the con-
tents of any wire, electronic or oral communication through the use of any elec-
tronic, mechanical, or other device." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1982). For a detailed
discussion of the definition, see C. Fism AN, WmnrAnppa A"D EAVESDRoPPING §
7.2 (1987). Certain categories of interceptions, such as particular activities of
switchboard operators, employees of communications common carriers, and the
Federal Communication Commission ["F.C.C."] are exempted from the warrant
requirement of Title HI. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(2)(a), (b) (1982). Persons "acting
under color of law" are authorized to intercept wire, oral and electronic com-
munications without a warrant so long as one participant to the conversation
consents in advance. Id. § 2511(2)(c). Private citizens are also permitted to do
this, assuming a participant consents in advance and the conversation is not being
intercepted for an unlawful or tortious purpose. Id. § 2511(2)(d). For a detailed
discussion of consensual interceptions, see Fishman, The Interception of Com-
munications Without a Court Order. Title l7, Consent, and the Erpectation of
Privacy, 51 ST. JOHN'S L. Rv. 41-98 (1977); C. FismAtAN, supra, §§ 8-19.
51 Title IR defines "wire communication," in pertinent part, as "any aural
transfer made in whole or in part through the use of facilities for the transmission
of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection between
the point of origin and the point of reception .... " 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (Supp.
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communications.' ' It is a detailed legislative scheme which specifies
who may authorize an investigator to apply for a court order, 97 the
information an application must contain and the findings a judge
must make before issuing the order,9 how the order is to be exe-
cuted,9 how recordings of intercepted conversations are to be se-
cured, 100 who must eventually receive notice that a phone was tapped
or a location was bugged, 10 and a host of other items. The statute
describes when information obtained from intercepted communica-
tions may be disclosed,102 identifies who may seek to suppress evi-
IV 1986). "Aural transfer" is defined as "a transfer containing the human voice
at any point between and including the point of origin and the point of recep-
tion." Id. § 2510(18) (Supp. IV 1986). Although these definitions were amended
in the ECPA, supra note 17, the 1986 amendments have no material effect on
this discussion. For a detailed discussion of these definitions, see C. FisHMAN,
supra note 93, § 7.5 (wire communication); id. § 7.17 (aural transfer).
95 Title III defines "oral communication" as "any oral communication uttered
by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to
interception under circumstances justifying such expectation, but such term does
not include any electronic communication." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2) (Supp. IV 1986).
Although this definition was amended in the ECPA, supra note 17, the 1986
amendment has no material effect on this discussion. For a detailed discussion of
these definitions, see C. FisHmAN, supra note 93, § 7.4.
96 "Electronic communication" is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12). In essence,
it includes many forms of radio communications, electronic mail and computer-
to-computer transmissions. For a detailed discussion, see C. FisHMAN, supra note
93, § 7.22. This definition was added to Title III by the ECPA, supra note 17,
a major feature of which is the statutory protection of the privacy of such
communications. The law governing interception of electronic communications is
similar to that regulating interception of wire and oral communications, but in
several significant respects it is easier to obtain a court order authorizing inter-
ception of the former than it is authorizing interception of the latter two.
9 See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
91 See infra notes 108-23 and accompanying text.
99 See infra notes 150-58 and accompanying text.
1- 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(a) (Supp. IV 1986) requires recordings to be made
available to the judge who issued the order, and "sealed under his directions."
For a detailed discussion of the sealing requirement, see C. FIsHMAN, supra note
93, §§ 191-202.
101 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(a) (Supp. IV 1986). See C. FisHmAN, supra note 93,
§§ 203-213.1.
102 18 U.S.C. § 2517 (Supp. IV 1986). In essence, disclosure is permitted only
when there is a valid law enforcement purpose for such disclosure. See C. FIsH-
mAN, supra note 93, §§ 148-148.3, 163-165.
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dence and on what grounds, °3 and sets forth an exclusionary rule.1°4
It also creates a civil cause of action for those whose communica-
tions are unlawfully intercepted. 0 5
In drafting the legislation in 1968, Congress sought to incorpo-
rate the constitutional prerequisites that the Supreme Court had
recently enunciated in Katz v. United States'°6 and, even more ex-
plicitly, in Berger v. New York.' The statute does more, however,
than merely parallel the Fourth Amendment and Supreme Court
decisions. Congress included within the statute several procedural
and substantive safeguards that are not constitutionally mandated,
many of which are not applicable to conventional search warrants.
The discussion below reviews the required contents of a non-emer-
gency Title III application and order, examines the statutory pro-
visions regulating how such orders are to be executed, and reviews
Supreme Court decisions construing these provisions.
A. Application and Order
1. In general. Because an interception order is in essence a special
kind of search warrant, it must comply with the Fourth Amend-
ment directive that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, ... particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized."'' 0 Title III therefore requires an
application for an interception order to establish probable cause to
believe "that an individual is committing, has committed, or is
about to commit a particular offense,"'' 9 and probable cause to
believe that "particular communications concerning that offense will
103 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a) (Supp. IV 1986) provides that any "aggrieved per-
son" may move to suppress wire, oral, or electronic communications on the
ground that the communication was "unlawfully intercepted," or was intercepted
pursuant to a facially invalid order, or was intercepted in violation of the terms
of the interception order. For a discussion of Supreme Court interpretation of the
phrase "unlawfully intercepted," see infra notes 140-49 and accompanying text.
Suppression of intercepted electronic communications may be sought only for
constitutional, not statutory, violations. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(c) (Supp. IV 1986).
,' 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (Supp. IV 1986) prohibits the receipt in evidence of
intercepted communications or derivative evidence if the disclosure of that infor-
mation would violate Title III.
]' 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (Supp. IV 1986). A good-faith reliance on a court order
is a defense to such an action. Id. § 2520(d).
389 U.S. 347 (1967). Katz is briefly summarized in supra notes 5, 74-75.
,o 388 U.S. 41 (1967). Berger is summarized in supra note 9.
'0 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (quoted in full at supra note 24).
1- 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a) (1982).
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be obtained" by intercepting communications over the targeted fa-
cilities or in the targeted premises.110 Each application and order
must contain a "particular description of the type of communica-
tion[sJ sought to be intercepted.""'
In addition, Congress has interposed several extra-constitutional
requirements. A federal investigator or prosecutor may apply to a
judge for an interception order only if he or she has first been
authorized to do so by "the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney
General, Associate Attorney General, any Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, any acting Assistant Attorney General, or any Deputy Assis-
tant Attorney General in the Criminal Division specially designated
by the Attorney General. '""12 Title III also restricts the crimes which
may be investigated by means of an interception order." ' Further,
an application must inform the judge of all known prior applica-
tions "involving any of the same persons, facilities or places," and
whether any such prior application was granted or denied."14 More-
over, the application must satisfy the judge that "normal investi-
gative procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably
,,o Id. §§ 2518(3)(b), (d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Concerning the roving in-
terception provision, in which the targeted facilities or premises are more uncer-
tain, see infra notes 210-83 and accompanying text,
M Id. § 2518(l)(b)(iii) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (application); id. § 2518(4)(c)
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (court order).
1 IS U.S.C. § 2516(1) (Supp. IV 1986). The Senate Judiciary Committee
Report on Title III explains:
This provision centralizes in a publicly responsible official subject to
the political process the formulation of law enforcement policy on the
use of electronic surveillance techniques. Centralization will avoid the
possibility that divergent practices might develop. Should abuses occur,
the lines of responsibility lead to an identifiable person. This provision
in itself should go a long way toward guaranteeing that no abuses
will happen.
S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 97, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONa.
& ADmnw. NEWS 2112, 2185. Cf. FED. R. Crnn. P. 41(a) (permitting any federal
law enforcement officer or attorney for the government to apply for a search
warrant).
"1 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (Supp. IV 1986). Compare FED. R. CRni. P. 41 (per-
mitting an agent to seek, and a judge or magistrate to issue, a search warrant to
search for evidence relating to any criminal offense).
'" 18 U.S.C. § 2518(I)(e) (Supp. IV 1986). The provision acts as a check
against "judge shopping" in the case of a previously rejected application. It also
alerts the judge to inquire about the results of a prior tap or bug if agents seek
a new order to investigate someone who had previously been targeted.
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appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous."1' s
Unlike a conventional search warrant, which may be issued by a
federal magistrate, only a federal district or circuit court judge may
issue an interception order." 6 The judge is empowered to reject the
application even if it complies fully with statutory requirements." 7
The judge also is authorized to require the investigators to submit
to the court periodic reports disclosing what progress has been
made toward accomplishing the goals of the investigation, thereby
allowing the judge to assess the necessity for continued surveil-
lance." 8
The application and order must specify the period of time during
which interceptions are to be bonducted,119 and the order must also
specify whether it authorizes the interception of more than one
incriminating conversation.120 Interceptions must cease when the au-
thorized objective has been attained.12 ' Special provisions govern
extension of the initial order. 2
Two of the requirements discussed above are of particular inter-
est here, because of the way Congress treated them in the "roving
intercept" provision.23 These are the "particular description" pro-
visions, and the identification requirement.
2. Particularity. Title III requires an application for an inter-
ception order to include:
a full and complete statement of the facts and circum-
stances relied upon by the applicant, to justify his belief
that an order should be issued, including (i) details as to
11 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c) (1982). There is no corresponding precondition for
a search warrant. Indeed, in the Title III context, a search warrant is a normal,
less intrusive procedure, the probable non-sufficiency of which must be explained
before an intercept order may issue.
116 18 U.S.C. § 2510(9)(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
Ir, S. RP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 102, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD3EKr. NEws 2112, 2191.
1- 18 U.S.C. § 2518(6) (1982); S. RE'. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 104,
reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADruN. NEws 2112, 2192.
1,9 I U.S.C. §§ 2518(1)(d), (4)(e) (1982). The maximum duration of an inter-
cept order is 30 days, unless the order is renewed. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (Supp.
IV 1986).
-2 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(1)(d), (4)(e) (1982).
1z, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (Supp. IV 1986).
'- 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(1)(f), (5) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
- See infra notes 21948 and accompanying text.
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the particular offense that has been, is being, or is about
to be committed, (ii) except as provided in subsection 11,
a particular description of the nature and location of the
facilities from which or the place where the communica-
tion is to be intercepted, (iii) a particular description of
the type of communications sought to be intercepted, (iv)
the identity of the person, if known, committing the of-
fense and whose communications are to be intercepted;
124
Congress included these provisions under the assumption that "[e]ach
of these requirements reflects the constitutional demand of partic-
ularization."1 2
Similarly, the interception order itself must specify, among other
information,
(a) the identity of the person, if known, whose commu-
nications are to be intercepted;
(b) the nature and location of the communications facil-
ities as to which, or the place where, authority to inter-
cept is granted;
(c) a particular description of the type of communication
sought to be intercepted, and a statement of the particular
offense to which it relates; .... 126
Thus, the Senate Judiciary Committee Report on Title III observed,
"the order will link up specific person, specific offense, and spe-
cific place. Together [these requirements, coupled with the probable
cause requirement] are intended to meet the test of the Constitution
that electronic surveillance techniques be used only under the most
124 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b) (Supp. IV 1986) (emphasis added). The italicized
phrase was added by the ECPA, supra note 17, to reflect the addition of section
2518(11), the roving intercept provision. Similarly, section 2518(3)(d) provides that
a judge may issue an order only if, "except as provided in subsection 11, there
is probable cause for belief that the facilities from which, or the place where, the
... communications are to be intercepted are being used, or are about to be
used, in connection with the commission of such offense ...... 18 U.S.C. §
2518(3)(d) (Supp. IV 1986) (emphasis added).
12 S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 101 (citing Berger v. New York,
388 U.S. 41, 58-60 (1967), and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 354-56
(1967)), reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADrmiN. NEws 2112, 2190.
12 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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precise and discriminate circumstances, which fully comply with the
requirement of particularity." 127
The statute, and the passages from the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee Report quoted above, speak in terms of "specific person,
specific offense, and specific place," but the degree of specificity
required was left for the courts to determine. The statutory lan-
guage left uncertainties as to what the application and order must
say and the degree of latitude to be afforded investigators in exe-
cuting the order.
a. "Specific offense." Most interception orders have been
granted to investigate ongoing criminal conduct, such as gambling
operations and narcotics distribution networks,Iu and courts have
consistently upheld applications and warrants which specify the tar-
geted offenses by generic type, statutory designation, or both.1' 9
Thus, for example, a narcotics wiretap can and should authorize
interception of all conversations relating to narcotics, not merely
those relating to a single, specific transaction.
b. "Specific person." Portions of Title III require the applica-
tion and order to specify "the identity of the person, if known,
whose communications are to be intercepted."' 30 Read in light of
Berger131 and the Senate Judiciary Committee Report, 32 these pro-
visions seem to define the permissible scope of monitoring in terms
of the targeted individuals as well as the specified crime and phone
or location. If a judge issued an order that identified X as a
probable narcotics trafficker and authorized a tap on X's phone,
for example, a strict reading of the statute would lead one to
12 S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 102 (again citing Berger and Katz),
reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADiaN. NEws 2112, 2191.
- See supra note 91.
'29 See, e.g., United States v. Cohen, 530 F.2d 43, 45-46 (5th Cir.) (narcotics),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 855 (1976); United States v. Turner, 528 F.2d 143, 154
(9th Cir. 1975) (narcotics), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 996 (1976); United States v.
Armocida, 515 F.2d 29, 37 (3d Cir.) (narcotics), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 858 (1975);
United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764, 780-81 (2d Cir.) (possession of stolen
property, burglary, forgery), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973); United States v.
Mainello, 345 F. Supp. 863, 872 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (gambling).
'3- 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(1)(b)(iv), (4)(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
"3 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). See supra note 9 (discussion of
case).
. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 102, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADrmN. NEws 2112, 2191. See supra notes 125, 127.
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believe that the investigators would be empowered to "search" X's
conversations, and only X's conversations, over that phone for
evidence relating to narcotics offenses. Several Supreme Court de-
cisions, however, have substantially reduced the significance of the
identification provisions, thereby broadening considerably what and
who the agents monitoring a tap or bug may listen to.
The first such decision was United States v. Kahn, 13 in which
FBI agents obtained a court order authorizing the interception of
bookmaking-related conversations "of Irving Kahn and others, as
yet unknown," over Kahn's home phone. The next day investiga-
tors intercepted Kahn's wife making two phone calls to another
gambler. These conversations were suppressed prior to trial and the
Seventh Circuit affirmed on appeal, 13 reasoning that the wiretap
order permitted interception only when Irving Kahn was a party to
the conversation1 35 The Supreme Court reversed, stressing that the
interception order authorized interception of conversations "of Irv-
ing Kahn and others," not just conversations "'between Irving Kahn
and others.""36 Since a primary purpose of the court order was to
identify and gather evidence against Kahn's confederates, the Court
concluded that Kahn himself need not be a party to a conversation
for it to be lawfully intercepted. 137
The Kahn decision dramatically reduced the significance of the
Title III identification provisions.3 8 A wiretap is no longer consid-
" 415 U.S. 143 (1974).
134 United States v. Kahn, 471 F.2d 191, 198 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 415 U.S.
143 (1974).
13- Id. at 196.
116 Kahn, 415 U.S. at 156.
13, Id. at 156-57. For an inciteful critique of this aspect of Kahn, see Gold-
smith, The Supreme Court and Title III: Rewriting the Law of Electronic Sur-
veillance, 74 J. GLUm. L. & CnaMNoIwoy 1, 88-93 (1983). The Court analogized
to a search warrant for physical evidence, and quoted a Second Circuit case with
approval: "The Fourth Amendment requires a warrant to describe only 'the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized,' not the persons from
whom things will be seized." Kahn, 415 U.S. at 155 n.15 (quoting United States
v. Fiorella, 468 F.2d 688, 691 (2d Cir. 1972) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 917 (1974)) . The logic is flawed for the simple reason
that the analogy is flawed. See supra note 11; Goldsmith, supra.
"I The Court noted that Title III only requires the naming of a person in the
application or order "if known," United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 157 (1973),
and only if there is probable cause to believe that the individual is "committing
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ered a warrant authorizing a "search" of the identified suspect's
conversations. Rather, the court order authorizes a "search" of the
telephone itself and of all conversations through that telephone,
regardless of who the participants of any particular conversation
might be.139
Later the same year, in two decisions not directly related to the
identification provisions but affecting their significance, the Court
concluded that a failure by the government to comply with a pro-
vision of Title III does not always render the interception of com-
munications "unlawful" and therefore subject to suppression.'
Rather, if a defendant can establish that a Title III provision has
been violated, a court must then assess whether that provision is
one of those which "directly and substantially implement the con-
gressional intention to limit the use of intercept procedures."' 41 If
the offense." Id. at 155. See also 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(1)(b)(iv), (4)(a) (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986) (quoted language). The majority found that when there is probable
cause to believe that a particular telephone is being used to commit an offense,
but no particular person is identifiable, the order may properly issue without
naming any specific party at all. Id. at 157.
'- This is so, of course, only if the goals of the wiretap or eavesdrop include
identifying other participants in the criminal scheme, and only if the court order
is worded in terms of communications "of X and others," rather than "of X
with others." Since the Kahn decision, identification of other participants should
be a stated goal of every properly drafted application under Title HI or its state
equivalents, and virtually every interception order has contained the words "con-
versations of X and others." See, e.g., UnrTED STATES ATroRNYs' MANuAL, Title
9-Criminal Division § 9-7.921 (Standard Form Interception Order), ch. 7, p. 821
(1985).
This is also not to suggest that agents may ignore the statutory directive to
"minimize'" the interception of non-pertinent conversations. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5)
(Supp. IV 1986). Minimization is discussed at infra notes 150-58 and accompanying
text.
-, United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 574-75 (1974); United States v.
Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 527 (1974). In Giordano, the application for the intercept
order was not authorized by any of the officials specified in 18 U.S.C. § 2516(l)
(Supp. IV 1986), but by the Attorney General's Executive Assistant. Giordano,
416 U.S. at 509-10. The issuing judge authorized the interceptions because they
were accompanied by letters bearing the signatures of a specially-designated As-
sistant Attorney General, but the special designee had not reviewed the applications
and someone in his office had affixed the signatures. Id. In Chavez, a proper
official had authorized each application, satisfying § 2516(1), but the memo sent
back to the agent applying for the warrant named a different official, resulting
in a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(a) (1982), which requires identification of
the authorizing officer.
141 Chavez, 416 U.S. at 575 (quoting Giordano); Giordano, 416 U.S. at 527.
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the provision does not meet this test, suppression will not follow.'42
Three years later, in United States v. Donovan, 43 the Court ap-
plied this test directly to the statutory identification provisions.
Even though it rejected the government's argument that Title III
only requires the application to list the "principal target" of the
investigation,'" and found that the government had failed to com-
ply with the identification provisions, 41 the Court held that these
provisions do not play a "substantive role" with respect to judicial
authorization of intercept orders.'" Hence, failure to properly iden-
tify some suspects did not render the interception order invalid and
did not require suppression of intercepted conversations. 47
In Giordano, the Court concluded that the provision specifying the officials who
may authorize applications, 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (Supp. IV 1986), was "intended
to play a central role in the statutory scheme and that suppression must follow
when it is shown that this statutory requirement has been ignored." Giordano,
416 U.S. at 528. The issue was decided correctly in light of the legislative intent.
See supra note 112 and accompanying text. For a critique of Giordano, see
Goldsmith, supra note 137; at 76-85.
Conversely, in Chavez, the Court concluded that the provision requiring iden-
tification in the application of the official who authorized the application, 18
U.S.C. § 2518(1)(a) (1982), had "[n]o role more significant than a reporting
function," Chavez, 416 U.S. at 579. Thus, so long as a properly empowered
official has given authorization, the application and order are valid, and the
interceptions lawful, even if another official has been incorrectly named in the
application and order.
142 Chavez, 416 U.S. at 579-80.
'l 429 U.S. 413 (1977). In Donovan, government agents learned during the
course of a wiretap that certain parties were discussing illegal gambling activities
with the original targets of the intercept order, but the agents failed to name the
parties along with others when they applied for an extension of the initial order.
Id. at 419. The district court suppressed all evidence gathered against these de-
fendants under the order and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Id. at 421.
'4 Donovan, 429 U.S. at 423-28.
Id. at 432.
'14 The issue as stated by the Court was "whether the identification in an
intercept application of all those likely to be overheard in incriminating conver-
sations plays a 'substantive role' with respect to judicial authorization of intercept
orders . . . ." Id. at 435-37. The Court found nothing in the legislative history
to suggest that the identification requirements played a "a central, or even func-
tional, role in guarding against unwarranted use of wiretapping or electronic sur-
veillance." Id. at 437. (quoting United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 578
(1974)).
14, Id. at 435-37. The Court added that a different result might have been
reached if the authorities had deliberately failed to identify certain individuals in
an application in order to mislead the judge. Id. at 436 n.23. The Court also
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As a result of Kahn and Donovan, the identification provisions
now serve only lesser purposes in the typical Title III interception
order. 148 They do not play a significant role in limiting the scope
of what and who the monitoring agents can listen to once they
obtain the court order. 49
B. Execution of an Intercept Order: the Minimization Provision
Legislative guidance for executing an order consists primarily of
a single sentence in Title III:
Every order and extension thereof shall contain a provi-
sion that the authorization to intercept shall be executed
as soon as practicable, shall be conducted in such a way
as to minimize the interception of communications not
otherwise subject to interception under this chapter, and
must terminate upon attainment of the authorized objec-
tive, or in any event in thirty days.'"c
Although some uncertainty exists about how to assess whether in-
vestigators have complied with this "minimization" provision,", it
clearly requires some attempt to avoid listening to or recording
conversations that are not particularly described in the order. The
provision does not require the monitoring agents to eliminate the
interception of non-pertinent conversations altogether, because the
agents cannot know, until a conversation is over, what the con-
versants will say to each other. On the other hand, it would be
improper to routinely intercept every conversation that occurs over
the tapped telephone or within the bugged location. One wiaely
noted that the inadvertently omitted suspects suffered no prejudice by their omis-
sion from the application. Id. For a critique of Donovan, see Goldsmith, supra
note 137, at 93-97.
148 Identification of all those likely to be intercepted helps alert the issuing
judge to the scope of the investigation, ensures fulfillment of the obligation to
inform the judge of prior applications, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(l)(e) (Supp. IV 1986),
and triggers the mandatory service of post-interception notice and inventory. 18
U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
149 The identification provisions have greater significance with regard to roving
intercept orders. See infra notes 219-27 and accompanying text.
Mo 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (Supp. IV 1986).
5 See C. FisHmAN, supra note 12, § 159.1; Fishman, The "Minimization"
Requirement in Electronic Surveillance: Title III, The Fourth Amendment, and
the Dread Scott Decision, 28 AM. U.L. Rnv. 315-361 (1979).
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approved partial solution to this dilemma is "spot-monitoring."
When a particular conversation appears to be non-pertinent but the
monitoring agent is unsure that it will remain so, he turns the
monitoring equipment off but resumes monitoring a minute or two
later, and he repeats the process until the conversation either ends
or turns to matters that are pertinent to the investigation." 2
In Scott v. United States,153 the Supreme Court considered how
compliance with the minimization provision should be assessed. The
Court held that the monitoring agents' conduct must be evaluated
under a standard of objective reasonableness, without regard to the
intent or motivation of the agents involved.1 4 Thus, if the facts
and circumstances render minimization difficult or impossible, even
failure to make any attempt to minimize is not a violation."3 5 More-
over, at least when investigators have reasonable cause to believe
they are probing a complex conspiracy involving a large number
of participants, it is permissible for monitors to listen to and record
all conversations until they have had "an opportunity to develop
a category of innocent calls.""16
After Scott, the minimization provision often provides only a
limited check on the broadened scope of monitoring permitted as
If2 See, e.g., United States v. Clerkley, 556 F.2d 709, 717 (4th Cir. 1977)
(approving spot-monitoring of calls), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 930 (1978); United
States v. Hinton, 543 F.2d 1002, 1011-12 (2d Cir.) (approving a five-minute "as-
certainment period" to spot-check telephone calls, where code language was being
used and many of the calls eventually became narcotics related), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 980 (1976); United States v. Losing, 539 F.2d 1174, 1180-81 (8th Cir. 1976)
(finding spot-checking permissible), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977); United States
v. Costello, 610 F. Supp. 1450, 1477 (N.D. 111. 1985) (agents may spot-check to
determine whether subject of conversation has shifted), aff'd mem., sub non.
United States v. Olson, 830 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Clemente,
482 F. Supp. 102, 108-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (approving a spot-monitoring procedure
in which two minutes of monitoring was followed by one minute off), aff'd mem.,
633 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1980); State v. Catania, 85 N.J. 418, 446, 427 A.2d 537,
551 (1981) (spot-monitoring is an effective method); People v Floyd, 41 N.Y.2d
245, 251, 360 N.E.2d 935, 941, 392 N.Y.S.2d 257, 263 (1976) (upholding procedure
in which monitoring intervals of 30 to 40 seconds were used).
15 436 U.S. 128 (1978).
'11 Id. at 137-39. The Court found that this was the appropriate standard under
Title III and under the Fourth Amendment. Id.
-S In Scott, the district court found that the agents "made no attempt to
comply" with the minimization provision. Id. at 133.
156 Id. at 142.
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a result of Kahn and Donovan.'5 Although the Justice Department
has not ignored the statutory mandate to minimize interception of
non-pertinent conversations,158 it is no overstatement that there are
few significant restrictions on what the agents may listen to when
executing a typical Title III wiretap or eavesdrop order.
III. THE "EmimGENcy SURvEILANcE" PROVISION
A. Interpretation and Application of the Requirements
Legislative regulation of emergency electronic surveillance can take
one of three approaches: prohibition of such surveillance altogether,
exclusion of such surveillance from the scope of the statute, or
specification of the circumstances under which such surveillance
may be conducted. When Congress enacted Title III, it attempted
to follow the third approach. The provision governing emergency
surveillance, section 2518(7),1 9 has significant flaws, however, and
the Justice Department's policy with regard to such surveillance has
been extremely, and perhaps excessively, cautious.160 As a result,
the provision has been invoked only rarely, and there has been
virtually no judicial discussion or interpretation of it.
In essence, the emergency surveillance provision'61 spells out five
requirements which must be satisfied if emergency nonwarrant sur-
L1 See supra notes 133-49 and accompanying text.
- In almost every reported federal case discussing minimization, the courts
have emphasized that the agents complied with the provision. See, e.g., United
States v. Lawson, 780 F.2d 535, 540 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v. Dorfman,
542 F. Supp. 345, 390-98 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other
grounds, 690 F.2d 1217, 1230 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v. Susquet, 547 F.
Supp. 1034, 1045-47 (N.D. Ill. 1982); United States v. Loften, 518 F. Supp. 839,
843-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). See also supra note 152 (cases cited therein).
18 U.S.C. § 2518(7) (Supp. IV 1986).
- See infra notes 205-09 and accompanying text.
6 The Title III emergency surveillance provision is contained in 18 U.S.C. §
2518(7) (Supp. IV 1986). As amended in 1984, Act of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L.
No- 98-473, § 1203(a), (b), 98 Stat. 1837, 2152, and in 1986, ECPA, supra note
17, § 101(c), 100 Stat. 1848, 1851, it provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of [Title IIl], any investigative
or Iaw enforcement officer, specially designated by the Attorney Gen-
eral, the Deputy Attorney General, or the Associate Attorney General
or by the principal prosecuting attorney of any State or subdivision
thereof acting pursuant to a statute of that State, who reasonably
determines that -
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veillance is to be lawful: (1) the factual basis for a standard inter-
cept order must exist, (2) there must be an "emergency situation,"
(3) the emergency must fit within a statutorily recognized category,
(4) an eligible official must give advance authorization for the in-
terception, and (5) a retroactive court order must be obtained within
forty-eight hours approving the interception. Problems of interpre-
tation or application exist with regard to several of these require-
ments.
1. Grounds for an order. Even though the emergency surveil-
lance provision does not require a pre-interception court order, all
of the requirements for such an order must exist at the time the
surveillance commences. In other words, there must be adequate
probable cause, the crime involved must be one of the offenses
designated by the statute, there must be a valid basis for belief
that other investigative procedures have been or would be unavail-
ing or too dangerous, and other requirements must be met. 162 In
general, therefore, judicial interpretation of these requirements
should apply equally well to the emergency context.
(a) an emergency situation exists that involves -
(i) immediate danger of death or serious physical injury to any
person,
(ii) conspiratorial activities threatening the national security interest,
or
(iii) conspiratorial activities characteristic of organized crime,
that requires a wire, oral, or electronic communication to be inter-
cepted before an order authorizing such interception can, with due
diligence, be obtained, and
(b) there are grounds upon which an order could be entered under
[Title III] to authorize such interception,
may intercept such wire, oral, or electronic communication if an ap-
plication for an order approving the interception is made in accordance
with [§ 2518] within forty-eight hours after the interception has oc-
curred, or begins to occur. In the absence of an order, such intercep-
tion shall immediately terminate when the communication sought is
obtained or when the application for the order is denied, whichever
is earlier. In the event such application for approval is denied, or in
any other case where the interception is terminated without an order
having been issued, the contents of any wire, oral or electronic com-
munication intercepted shall be treated as having been obtained in
violation of this chapter, and [notice of such interceptions] shall be
served on the person named in the application.
262 The statutory requirements for an interception order are discussed in supra
notes 108-23 and accompanying text.
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2. "Emergency situation." Although Title III does not define
this term, the Senate Judiciary Committee Report on the statute
states:
Often in criminal investigations a meeting will be set
up and the place finally chosen almost simultaneously.
Requiring a court order in these situations would be tan-
tamount to failing to authorize the surveillance. The pro-
vision reflects existing search warrant law in which the
principle of emergency search is well established.' m
This passage can be read as expressing Congressional intent that
an "emergency situation" will be found to exist whenever there are
grounds for an interception order, and there is good reason to
believe that a crime-related meeting or phone conversation will oc-
cur before an interception order can be obtained. This definition
of "emergency situation" appears broader than is advisable or even,
perhaps, constitutional.'6 Hence, Congress limited the types of
emergencies in which the provision may be invoked.
3. Factual settings in which emergency surveillance is permitted.
Aside from threats to national security,' 6 the emergency surveil-
lance provision applies only in situations involving "immediate dan-
ger of death or serious physical injury to any person,''166 or
I- S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 104 (citing Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132 (1925); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)), reprinted in
1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMN. NEvs 2112, 2193. In Carroll, the Court held
for the first time that if a police officer has probable cause to believe that an
automobile being driven on the public highways contains contraband, he may stop
it and conduct a search of it without first obtaining a warrant. Carroll, 267 U.S.
at 155-56. Among other reasons, the Court emphasized that the automobile might
leave the jurisdiction or be emptied of the contraband by the time the officer
could obtain a warrant. Id. at 146. Schmerber is discussed at supra notes 40-42
and accompanying text.
- See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text. Presumably, this is why
Congress chose to restrict such surveillance to "organized crime" investigations.
See supra notes 172-75 and accompanying text.
10 Interceptions conducted primarily for national security purposes, rather than
to enforce the criminal law, are regulated by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 [hereinafter FISA]. See S. REP.
No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 395 n.9, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADmN. NEws 1, 354. For an analysis of FISA, see C. FiaAN, supra note 12,
§§ 348-76.
1- 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7)(a)(i) (Supp. IV 1986).
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"conspiratorial activities characteristic of organized crime."1 67 The
former is referred to below as the "immediate danger clause," and
the latter as the "organized crime clause."
a. The immediate danger clause. Surprisingly, until amended in
1984, section 2518(7) had not explicitly authorized emergency sur-
veillance in life-threatening situations. Such surveillance was lawful
only if the Justice Department could rationally conclude that the
conduct in question fit within the organized crime clause. As a
result, on at least a few occasions law enforcement officials decided
that they could not lawfully conduct surveillance even where such
surveillance would have assisted efforts to protect or rescue a vic-
tim.ss The 1984 amendment to section 2518(7) thus filled an ap-
palling gap in Title III.
The report of the Senate committee that drafted the amendment
spells out the intended scope of the immediate danger clause:
The type of situations intended to be included within this
exception generally would relate to those involving the
taking of a hostage, the kidnapping of a victim, or the
planning of an execution. These and similar situations
involve serious and immediate threats to the life of in-
nocent victims, and the use of electronic surveillance would
focus more on the prevention of serious injury or death
to that victim than it would on the collection of evidence
which would be of secondary importance at the time.169
The immediate danger clause is likely to cause few problems of
interpretation, although some circumstances can be imagined in
which the required degree of immediacy 170 or danger 71 is in doubt.
Id. § 2518(7)(a)(iii).
See Wiretap Amendments, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Criminal
Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 17-19 (1980) (prepared statement of L. Colewell, Executive Assistant Direc-
tor, Federal Bureau of Investigation) [hereinafter Wiretap Hearings]. These hear-
ings were held to discuss an earlier attempt to add an "immediate danger" clause
to § 2518(7); although passed in the Senate by voice vote, it died for lack of
action in the House. See S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 394 n.3, reprinted
in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADhim. NEws 3182, 3533.
16,9 S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 396, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADmw.n. NEws 3182, 3535.
170 Suppose, for example, the authorities learn of an assassination that will be
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b. The organized crime clause. Although this clause has been
part of Title III since its original enactment in 1968, it has almost
never been invoked.'2 One reason for the clause's dormance may
be its vagueness. Neither Title III nor its legislative history offer
any definition of "organized crime" or of "conspiratorial activities
characteristic of" it.
Congress did, however, include a definition of "organized crime"
in a different section of the Act in which Title III appears: "'Or-
ganized crime' means the unlawful activities of the members of a
highly organized, disciplined association engaged in supplying illegal
goods and services, including but not limited to gambling, prosti-
tution, loan sharking, narcotics, labor racketeering, and other un-
lawful activities of members of such organizations."' 13 This definition
and the title of which it was a part have been since repealed. 1 4
Whether it ever applied or might still apply to the Title III emer-
gency surveillance provision, or clarifies it to any significant extent
is, of course, open to debate. 75
attempted on a specific date several weeks hence, at a political convention, and
also learn that some, but probably not all, of the plotters will be meeting to-
morrow to hammer out the details. Arresting those who attend the meeting may
not foil the plot; therefore, eavesdropping on the meeting offers the best chance
to learn how to prevent the assassination. The assassination attempt itself is not
"immediate," but the need to eavesdrop upon the meeting is, since those at the
meeting may finalize their plans and go underground separately. In such a case
the authorities should conduct the surveillance, even though it is not completely
clear whether it would be lawful to do so.
"I Suppose the authorities learn of a plan to rob a bank the next day and
have an opportunity to eavesdrop upon two or more of the plotters to learn the
particulars, including the identity of the targeted bank. There is no reason to
suspect that the robbers intend to kill or injure anyone, but armed robberies are
inherently dangerous to human life and health. Although the statute speaks less
clearly than might be desired, emergency surveillance certainly would be eminently
reasonable under these circumstances.
- In 1980, spokesmen for the Justice Department and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation reported to the Senate Judiciary Committee that the provision had
been invoked only in life-threatening situations. See Wiretap Hearings, supra note
168, at 7 (Testimony of Phillip B. Heymann, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal
Division); id. at 11 (prepared statement of Mr. Heymann). Apparently this is still
Department policy. See infra notes 205-07 and accompanying text.
173 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351,
tit. I, § 601(b), 82 Stat. 197, 209 (formerly codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3781(b), but
now repealed).
27 Act of Dec. 27, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-157, 93 Stat. 1167.
-T' A few state courts have applied this definition, but their decisions provide
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4. Pre-interception authorization. Emergency surveillance is law-
ful only if authorized by the United States Attorney General, the
Deputy Attorney General, or the Associate Attorney General.'7 6 Un-
til the 1984 amendment to section 2518(7),17 only the Attorney
General was empowered to authorize such surveillance. In all like-
lihood, the difficulty in obtaining the immediate attention of one
of only three officials in the entire Department of Justice discour-
ages investigators from even seeking approval for emergency sur-
veillance.
5. Post-interception authorization. Within forty-eight hours of
the commencement of interception, the officials conducting the in-
terception must submit an application to a judge seeking an order
approving of the surveillance.' 78 In deciding whether to issue such
an order, the judge to whom the application is submitted must
determine whether the application complies with all other aspects
of Title III,179 and must also determine whether the pre-application
situation truly qualified as an "emergency.' 0 To date, no reported
little guidance on its application generally. See Shingleton v. State, 39 Md. App.
527, 535-36, 387 A.2d 1134, 1139 (1978) (conspiracy among three persons to
distribute cocaine did not constitute "organized crime"; interceptions suppressed);
Commonwealth v. Thorpe, 384 Mass. 271, 281, 424 N.E.2d 250, 255-56 (1981)
(where individual offering to sell an upcoming police promotion examination claimed
to be part of an "organization," sufficient nexus to organized crime was shown
to justify non-warrant consensual surveillance which is permissible in Massachusetts
only to investigate "organized crime"); Commonwealth v. Jarabek, 384 Mass.
293, 296, 424 N.E.2d 491, 493 (1981) (a scheme by two municipal officials to
extort a kickback from a single contractor did not create a reasonable suspicion
that organized crime was involved; consensual interception suppressed); State v.
Nobozny, 54 Ohio St. 2d 195, 207-08, 375 N.E.2d 784, 793 (1978) (participation
of at least three individuals in a kidnapping was sufficiently characteristic of
"organized crime"; emergency interceptions were properly admitted in subsequent
murder trial). Thorpe and Jarabek are discussed in Note, Relaxing the Organized
Crime Requirement for Electronic Surveillance: A Carte Blanche for the "Unin-
vited Ear"? 5 W. NEw ENG. L. REv. 725 (1983).
176 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7) (Supp. IV 1986). The principal prosecuting attorney of
a state or subdivision thereof may also authorize it in pursuance of a state statute.
Id.
" The 1984 amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7) was a small part of the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1203(a), 98
Stat. 1837, 2152.
178 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7) (Supp. IV 1986).
'I See id. § 2518(7)(b).
110 Neither Title III, the Senate report on Title III, nor the Senate reports on
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federal case addresses any of the issues outlined in this paragraph.
B. Justice Department Policies and Practices
To properly evaluate the Title III emergency surveillance provi-
sion, it is necessary to understand the practices and policies the
Justice Department follows in invoking the provision. Since these
policies and practices are best understood in the context of the
Department's normal procedures for processing Title III applica-
tions, however, it is to that subject that we first turn.
1. The application authorization process.'8' Before a government
attorney or investigator may apply to a judge for an interception
order, he or she must be authorized to do so by one of only a
few authorizing officials at the Department of Justice.'1 As might
be expected, the decision to employ so potentially intrusive and
expensive an investigative technique is reviewed at the local level
before it ever reaches the Justice Department. This local review is,
as a rule, conducted both by the special agent in charge of the
field office of the applicable investigative agency'3 and by the United
States Attorney's Office or the federal Strike Force Attorney whose
the 1984 and 1986 amendments to 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7) specifically require a judge
to assess the adequacy of the emergency in deciding whether to issue an order of
approval. Nevertheless, a judicial responsibility to do so is implicit in the "exigent
circumstances" exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, and
Congress intended to codify this exception with regard to interception of com-
munications when it enacted Title III. See S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess
104, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADNmN. Nnws 2112, 2193.
-8' Unless otherwise noted, the information contained in this section is based
on discussions in 1985 and 1987 with Frederick Hess and Maureen Killian, the
Director and Senior Attorney, respectively, of the Office of Enforcement Opera-
tions, United States Department of Justice. One of the primary functions of the
Office of Enforcement Operations is to review and evaluate all Title III applica-
tions before they are submitted to a statutorily designated official for approval.
11 Authorizing officials include the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral, Associate Attorney General, or an Assistant Attorney General whom the
Attorney General has specially designated. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (1982 & Supp. IV
1986). See supra note 112 and accompanying text. Until this provision was amended
in 1984, only the Attorney General or a specially designated Assistant Attorney
General could authorize applications.
18 The applicable investigative agency is usually the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation ["FBI"] or the Drug Enforcement Agency ["DEA"]. Thereafter it is
submitted to the agency's headquarters in Washington for further review.
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geographical jurisdiction includes the targeted telephone or prem-
ises.I8t
How long does this local review process take? The only accurate
generalization is that it varies depending on the case, 1 5 the agency,
the region, and the United States Attorney's Office. Department of
Justice officials in Washington estimate that, on the average, the
review process on the local and regional level takes three to four
weeks.18
6
The main document in the application is an affidavit, usually
submitted by an investigator,'8 which is drafted to supply all of
the information required by Title III. The affidavit must, among
other things, 8 specify the targeted premises or telephone, 89 identify
the targets of the intercept, if known,' 90 provide details of the
investigation to date, demonstrating probable cause to believe that
conversations relating to specific crimes will be intercepted over the
phone or in the premises in question, 9' and further demonstrating
that ordinary investigative techniques have been tried and have
failed, or would not succeed if tried, or would be too dangerous. 92
If a particular application is the first to be used in an investigation,
merely drafting the affidavit is likely to take several days. 93
18 The special agent in charge of the investigative agency's field office and the
United States Attorney each apparently has veto power. The United States Attor-
neys' Manual directs, for example, that
it is encumbent upon any United States Attorney in whose district an
application for a Title III interception order is to be filed to evaluate
personally the merits of the proposed application prior to its submis-
sion to the Department of Justice for filing authorization. A United
States Attorney should not authorize the submission of any application
unless, in his judgment, the interception would foster the interests of
justice. He should not approve an authorization request solely because
an investigative agency strongly urges it.
UNITED STATs ATTORNEYs' MANUAL, tit. 9, ch. 7, at 12-12a (1985).
183 Some investigations might require months to acquire probable cause to tap
or bug a particular telephone or premises.
116 See supra note 181.
-8 The investigator is usually an FBI or DEA agent or, less frequently, a
government attorney.
188 For a more detailed summary of what a Title III application must contain,
see supra notes 108-49 and accompanying text.
IB9 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b)(ii) (Supp. IV 1986).
,9o Id. § 2518(1)(b)(iv).
191 Id. § 2518(1)(b); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(3)(a),(b),(d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
J92 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(l)(c), (3)(a) (1982).
,1" This, at least, was my own experience as a prosecutor in the New York
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In addition to the affidavit, the application package contains the
application itself and a draft of the interception order. If the U.S.
Attorney and the investigative agency's special agent both approve
the interception application package, it is then sent to Washington,
usually by courier or express mail. Once again, it is subject to a
dual review process by both the Justice Department attorneys and
the investigative agency.
Within the Justice Department, all Title III application packages
are referred to the Criminal Division's Office of Enforcement Op-
erations ["OEO"]. The director of OEO reviews each of the doc-
uments, sends, a copy of the affidavit to the appropriate litigating
section in the Criminal Division,'1' and assigns the matter to one
of OEO's attorneys. The OBO attorney examines the application
to determine whether the affidavit and proposed order comply with
Title III and Justice Department standards.
When this examination is complete, the OEO attorney prepares
a memorandum summarizing the application. This memorandum
consists of: (a) a list of the premises and telephones in question,
(b) a brief biography of the intended interceptees, (c) a statement
as to whether any of the individuals, telephones or premises spec-
ified in the application have been the targets of prior interception
applications, 195 (d) a summary of the body of the application, out-
County District Attorney's Office and New York City's Special Narcotics Prose-
cutor's Office (1969-1977). The typical affidavit in a federal Title Il application
is 30 to 50 pages long.
194 The sections are Narcotics, Organized Crime, and Public Integrity. The
primary purpose for section review is to obtain an assessment of whether the
investigation in which the proposed intercept will occur is important enough to
merit the use of wiretapping or eavesdropping, although on occasion the sections
also alert OEO to potential legal problems. As a rule, the section evaluations are
returned to OEO within one or two days after the matter was referred to them.
Approximately 600o of federal Title III applications currently focus on narcotics
trafficking. Most of the rest fall within the organized crime or public integrity
categories. On rare occasions, a Title III order is sought to investigate criminal
conduct relating to the nation's internal security, but most surveillance for this
purpose is conducted pursuant to FISA, supra note 165. For a detailed discussion
of FISA, see C. FsmsAN, supra note 12, §§ 348-80.
"9 Each application must contain "a full and complete statement of the facts
concerning all previous applications known to the individual authorizing and mak-
ing the application .. . ." 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(e) (Supp. IV 1986). Because the
individual authorizing the application is a Justice Department official, the required
statement about prior applications is compiled by the Justice Department after a
computer check of its Title III files.
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lining probable cause and the particulars of the offenses being
investigated, (e) an evaluation of the application's discussion of
alternate procedures, (f) a brief discussion of minimization, 96 and
(g) a recommendation as to whether the application should be sub-
mitted to an authorizing official. The memorandum is reviewed by
the director of OEO, who then submits it, together with the ap-
plication, affidavit and order, a memorandum from the investiga-
tive agency, 97 a memorandum from the Criminal Division litigating
section, and other documents, 98 to the authorizing official. 199
OEO officials estimate that it takes them approximately three to
five days to review and approve a typical application, assuming it
measures up to standards. 20° If an affidavit is weak in one or more
respects, approval is withheld until the OEO is satisfied. OEO of-
ficials are reluctant to approve an application where the probable
cause showing is marginal, for example, or where there is concern
that the probable cause showing is stale.20' It is not unusual for
the OEO attorney to confer frequently by telephone with the in-
"9 Minimization is discussed supra in notes 150-58 and accompanying text.
19, The investigative agency memorandum is usually a page or so in length.
The director of OEO estimated that 85% of Title III applications involve the FBI
and that the DEA is the enforcement agency in most of the rest. Within the FBI,
each application is examined both by the Legal Counsel Division and the Criminal
Division.
191 These consist of a memorandum signed by the authorizing official author-
izing submission of the application to a judge, and other memoranda informing
the applicant and the United States Attorney that they are authorized to submit
the application to the judge.
,99 The term "authorizing official" is defined at supra note 182.
The process can be compressed into several hours if a satisfactory affidavit
application and proposed order have been prepared, see supra note 193 and ac-
companying text, if compelling circumstances exist and if the agents who will
conduct the tap or bug can assure OEO that they are prepared and ready to do
whatever is necessary technically to commence interception promptly once the
order is issued.
20, "Generally, the Department expects the basic probable cause to be no more
than 15 days old at the time the file containing the proposed affidavit, application
and order are received by the Office of Enforcement Operations . . . ." UNITED
STATES ATToRNEys' MANuAL, tit. 9, ch. 7, at 19 (1985). The probable cause
showing can be updated, when necessary, by additional visual surveillance infor-
mation from informers, or by using a "pen register." A pen register is a device
that records only the numbers dialed from a particular telephone and reveals no
other information; therefore, pen registers are not regulated by Title 111. United
States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U.S. 159, 170 (1977).
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vestigative agent and government attorney who have drafted the
documents, and who will supervise the investigation once the in-
tercept order is issued, to clarify ambiguities in the papers and to
discuss how possible shortcomings may be corrected. Once OEO
approves an application, it usually must then hold the application
in abeyance for another two or three days until the investigative
agency has finished its own review.
For several reasons, the Justice Department routinely processes
extensions2 2 more quickly than original requests. First, because lit-
igation section officials have already determined that the investi-
gation is important enough to merit the use of wiretapping or
eavesdropping, there is no need to refer an extension to the various
litigating sections. Second, the investigative agencies do not conduct
their own review of extensions at headquarters level. Third, the
probable cause showing for an extension usually consists primarily
of excerpts of communications intercepted during the initial order,
supplemented by descriptions of physical surveillance and other
sources of information, and is therefore easier to analyze.
Whether the application relates to a new investigation or an ex-
tension, the final step in the process is the submission of applica-
tion, affidavit, order, and accompanying documents and
memoranda °3 to an authorizing official. Most often, the official is
the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Criminal Division,
who usually acts on the matter the same day he receives it.Y If
- "Extension," as used here, is an interception order authorizing continued
interception on an already existing tap or bug. Applications for a "second gen-
eration order," an order to tap or bug a new phone or premises based on
information obtained from an ongoing tap or bug, are discussed at infra note
208-09 and accompanying text.
2 See supra notes 197-98 and accompanying text (discussion of memoranda).
- The primary purpose for requiring an authorizing official's approval is to
assure that a politically responsible official makes the policy judgment that the
case at hand merits the use of wiretapping or eavesdropping. See supra note 112.
Defendants seeking to suppress evidence obtained from wiretapping or eavesdrop-
ping occasionally seek to challenge the scope or nature of the authorizing official's
review of the application. Courts have consistently held, however, that a statu-
torily-authorized official is entitled to what amounts to an irrebuttable presumption
that he or she has exercised this authority properly, United States v. O'Malley,
764 F.2d 38, 40-41 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v. Todisco, 667 F.2d 255, 259
(2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 906 (1983); United States v. Turner, 528
F.2d 143, 150-51 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 996 (1976), and that it
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the Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division is una-
vailable, or if that post is vacant, the application is usually sub-
mitted to another specially designated assistant attorney general, or
on rare occasions to the Associate Attorney General.
2. Emergency Surveillance.205 The Justice Department has a
straightforward policy concerning the Title III emergency surveil-
lance provision: it does not approve pre-interception order surveil-
lance except in life-threatening situations. Emergency surveillance is
not authorized merely to gather evidence of criminal activity.
OEO officials gave several reasons for this policy. First, the
requirements of the emergency provision are ambiguous, leaving
enforcement officials uncertain about what it requires and what it
permits. 206 Second, OEO officials fear that the haste with which
emergency applications must be handled creates an unacceptably
high risk that mistakes will be made which will render the surveil-
lance unlawful. 207 Third, officials of the Justice Department are
convinced that, except in life-threatening situations, emergency sur-
veillance simply is not necessary.
is entirely proper for such an official to rely upon the summaries and recommen-
dations of subordinates, United States ex rel. Machi v. United States Dep't of
Probation & Parole, 536 F.2d 179, 184 (7th Cir. 1976) (application summarized
for authorizing official by subordinate over telephone); United States v. Falcone,
505 F.2d 478, 481 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 955 (1975) (telephone
summary); United States v. Acon, 403 F. Supp. 1189, 1194-95 (W.D. Pa. 1975)
(written summary).
205 Except as otherwise specified, the information in this section is based on
conversations with Justice Department officials. See supra note 181.
206 See supra notes 172-75 and accompanying text. These uncertainties are ag-
gravated by the lack of case law interpreting and applying the provision. Of
course, if the Department had invoked the provision more frequently, it is likely
that a body of case law discussing it would have developed by now.
It is particularly difficult, they insisted, to evaluate the factual basis for
surveillance-probable cause to believe that specific individuals will use a specific
telephone or premises to discuss specific crimes-based on a telephone conversation
between OEO personnel and the government attorney or investigator who seeks
approval of the surveillance. Problems multiply when, as is usually the case, the
attorney or investigator is relating information obtained second- or third-hand
from other investigators and informers concerning fast-breaking developments. Un-
til the factual justification for an interception is committed to paper in an affi-
davit, OEO officials maintain, there is too great a risk that gaps in the needed
factual showing may be overlooked. The problem is particularly acute, they said,
because emergency surveillance requires them to deal with so fluid a factual sit-
uation: the information establishing probable cause is developing at the same time
that they must evaluate the necessity for the interception.
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It is not necessary to invoke the emergency provision when the
need to tap a new phone or bug a new premises arises in the
context of an ongoing Title III investigation, OEO officials main-
tain, because those conducting the investigation should be able to
draft a new intercept application, affidavit and order for the new
phone or premises in a matter of hours 0 3 OEO can process these
papers, including review by a statutorily authorized official, within
hours of when the papers are received.20 Nor is emergency sur-
veillance truly necessary in situations not already involving a Title
III intercept, OEO officials insist. Such situations arise only rarely,
and are unlikely to pose "once-in-a-lifetime" opportunities. They
feel it is better to follow established procedures, obtain an inter-
ception order, and be ready when the targets decide to transact
their next deal.
Thus, the Justice Department has invoked the emergency sur-
veillance provision of Title III only in life-threatening situations,
about once a year over the last several years. Usually in such
situations, the Attorney General discusses the need for such sur-
veillance with the director of the investigative agency. If he decides
that such surveillance is required, he authorizes the director to
conduct the surveillance if the director determines that there is
probable cause to do so. Then, as the statute requires, a law en-
- Although an extension application must satisfy the same statutory requirc-
ments as an original or first generation application, as a practical matter the
affidavit in a second generation application need not reproduce all of the infor-
mation contained in the first generation application; it suffices to incorporate the
prior affidavit by reference and attach a copy of it to the second generation
application. Of course, the second generation application must demonstrate why
normal investigative procedures have not or would not suffice. Compare United
States v. Santora, 583 F.2d 453, 466-67 (9th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 441
U.S. 939, suppression reaff'd after remand, 600 F.2d 1317, 1322 (1979) (failure
to detail other procedures that had been employed to investigate targets of the
new tap invalidated second generation order) with United States v. Williams, 580
F.2d 578, 588-90 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (length and complexity of investigation that
preceded the first generation order, risk that ordinary procedures at new location
might alert targets, and need to act quickly lest important opportunities be lost
satisfied the other procedures requirement in second generation application) and
United States v. O'Malley, 764 F.2d 38, 43-44 (Ist Cir. 1985) (where targets of
second generation applications were the same individuals who were targets of the
first generation order, ordinary procedures showing for first generation order ap-
plied to second generation application as well).
This occurs about five to ten times a year.
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forcement official applies to a judge for a retroactive order of
approval within forty-eight hours of the commencement of inter-
ception.
IV. Tm ROVING INTERCEPT PROVISION
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 ["ECPA"]210
substantially revised the law of electronic communications and elec-
tronic surveillance. Among the most dramatic and significant pro-
visions added to Title III by ECPA is the roving intercept
provision. 2" This provision creates an express exception in certain
circumstances to the requirement that an application and order
specify the telephone to be tapped or the location to be bugged. 212
210 Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986). The most dramatic impact of
the ECPA is the creation of a new legal category, electronic communications, and
provisions protecting the privacy, and regulating the interception, of such com-
munications. See generally C. Fistmua, supra note 12, §§ 7.21-7.70.
211 18 U.S.C. § 2518(11) (Supp. IV 1986).
212 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b)(ii) (Supp. IV 1986) requires that an application for
an interception order must contain "a particular description of the nature and
location of the facilities from which or the place where the communication is to
be intercepted." Similarly, § 2518(3)(d) requires that before a judge issues an
interception order, he or she must find that there is probable cause for belief that
the facilities or the place targeted for interception are being used, or are about
to be used, in connection with the commission of the offenses specified in the
application, or are leased to, listed in the name of, or commonly used by the
individuals targeted in the application.
The roving intercept provision says:
(11) The requirements of subsections (1)(b)(ii) and (3)(d) of this section
relating to the specification of the facilities from which, or the place
where, the communication is to be intercepted do not apply if-
(a) in the case of an application with respect to the interception of
an oral communication-
(i) the application is by a Federal investigative or law enforcement
officer and is approved by the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney
General, the Associate Attorney General, an Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, or an acting Assistant Attorney General;
(ii) the application contains a full and complete statement as to why
such specification is not practical and identifies the person committing
the offense and whose communications are to be intercepted; and
(iii) the judge finds that such specification is not practical; and
(b) in the case of an application with respect to a wire or electronic
communication-
(i) the application is by a Federal investigative or law enforcement
officer and is approved by the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney
General, the Associate Attorney General, an Assistant Attorney Gen-
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In essence, the roving intercept provision provides that if federal
investigators can show that specification of the particular place for
interception of an oral communication is not practical, they may
obtain an oral intercept order authorizing them to intercept all of
their suspect's face-to-face conversations relating to the crime under
investigation, no matter where those conversations happen to oc-
cur.213 Similarly, if federal investigators can show that a suspect is
changing telephones with the purpose of thwarting interception,
they may obtain an intercept order authorizing them to intercept
all of their suspect's telephone conversations relating to the crime
under investigation, no matter what telephone he uses. 2 4
The application and order are the same, in most respects, for a
roving intercept as they are for a standard wiretap or oral intercept.
In some respects, however, the requirements for a roving intercep-
tion order differ significantly from those that apply to other Title
III applications and orders. The discussion below explains the ad-
ditional requirements that must be satisfied before investigators may
obtain a roving intercept order, the special issues that arise when
such an order is being used, and the provision's constitutional va-
lidity.
A. Application and Order: Additional Requirements
To obtain a roving intercept order, investigators must satisfy the
standard Title III requirements25 and, in addition, must identify
the intended interceptee, make a special showing of need to justify
waiving the particular location or facilities requirement, and "par-
ticularly describe" the sought-after conversations in ways that differ
from a standard intercept order. Moreover, fewer Justice Depart-
eral, or an acting Assistant Attorney General;
(i) the application identifies the person believed to be committing
the offense and whose communications are to be intercepted and the
applicant makes a showing of a purpose, on the part of that person,
to thwart interception by changing facilities; and
(ii) the judge finds that such purpose has been adequately shown.
18 U.S.C. § 2518(11) (Supp. IV 1986).
The application of the roving intercept provision is limited to some degree by
18 U.S.C. § 2518(12) (Supp. IV 1986) (quoted in full infra note 241).
. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(11)(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
2 See id. § 2518(11)(b).
71, See supra notes 108-49 and accompanying text.
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ment officials are empowered to authorize a roving intercept ap-
plication than are empowered to authorize a standard intercept
order application.
1. Authorization for application. The list of officials who may
authorize a roving intercept application is similar to the list of
those who may authorize standard Title III intercept applications,
with the notable exception that "any Deputy Assistant Attorney
General in the Criminal Division specially designated by the Attor-
ney General" may authorize a standard, but not a roving, inter-
cept. 2 6 Although the legislative history of ECPA contains no explicit
explanation for this more "limited list ''27 of authorizing officials,
the reason is obvious enough. A roving tap or bug is potentially
far more intrusive into privacy than a standard interception order,
so it is even more important to centralize the policy decisions in a
"publicly responsible official subject to the political process." 218
2. Identity of intended interceptee. In essence, in the roving in-
tercept provision, Congress has substituted particularity of the in-
terceptee's identity for particularity of the facilities or location of
the intercept. A standard Title III application and order must in-
clude "the identity of the person, if known, committing the offense
and whose communications are to be intercepted. ' 21 9 As this phrase
has been interpreted by the Supreme Court, once investigators ob-
tain a standard wiretap or oral intercept order, they may listen to
any conversation that occurs on the targeted phone or location,
even if none of the participants in the conversation has been pre-
viously identified as a suspect in criminal conduct, even, that is, if
all the conversants are "unknowns, ' ' O so long as they comply with
the mandate to minimize the interception of communications that
are not pertinent to the investigation.' By contrast, under the
216 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2516(l) (Supp. IV 1986) (standard intercepts) with 18
U.S.C. § 2518(11)(a)(i) (Supp. IV 1986) and 18 U.S.C. § 2518(11)(b)(i) (Supp. IV
1986).
21, S. REP. No. 541, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 31, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CoN . & AD Nmr. NEws 3555, 3585.
218 See S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 97, reprinted in 1968 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADNuN. NEws 2112, 2185 (quoted in full supra note 112).
219 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(1)(b)(iv), (4)(a) (1982 and Supp. IV 1986) (emphasis
added).
2 See supra notes 130-49 and accompanying text.
21 Minimization is discussed in supra notes 150-58 and accompanying text.
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roving intercept provision, an oral, wire or electronic intercept ap-
plication is sufficient only if it "identifies the person believed to
be committing the offense and whose communications are to be
intercepted... ." The omission of the phrase "if known" from
the roving intercept provision, although not explicitly discussed in
the reports of either the Senate or House Judiciary Committees,2
is obviously intended to limit the availability and use of these
intercepts.224
Roving intercept orders are permissible only when the application
demonstrates that a particular identified individual or individuals
can be expected to use numerous telephones or locations to discuss
their crimes as a means of evading surveillance.m This more de-
manding identification requirement precludes investigators from us-
ing a roving intercept order as authority to intercept communications
between two "unknowns."
The question remains: how fully must a roving intercept appli-
cation and order "identify" the interceptee? Neither the statute nor
the legislative history provides an answer. It is unlikely, however,
that Congress intended to insist that the application necessarily
contain the interceptee's true name, date of birth, permanent ad-
dress, and occupation. The likely targets of a roving intercept-
organized criminals, sophisticated narcotics traffickers, terrorists, and
Minimization of roving intercepts is discussed in infra notes 270-76 and accom-
panying text.
18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(11)(a)(ii), (11)(b)(ii) (Supp. IV 1986).
See S. REP. No. 541, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 31-33, reprinted in 1986 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADtmq. NEws 3555, 3585-87; H.R. REP. No. 647, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. 52-53 (1986).
214 There is also a quirk in the language of these subsections that is not
explained in the Senate Report and for which I can fathom no reason. A roving
oral intercept order is permitted if, among other things, the application "identifies
the person committing the offense and whose communications are to be intercepted
.... " 18 U.S.C. § 2518(11)(a)(ii) (Supp. IV 1986) (emphasis added). A roving
wiretap or electronic intercept is permitted if, among other things, the application
"identifies the person believed to be committing the offense and whose commu-
nications are to be intercepted . .. ." 18 U.S.C. § 2518(11)(b)u) (Supp. IV 1986)
(emphasis added). Presumably, probable cause to believe that the person is com-
mtting the offense under investigation would be required, and would be sufficient,
to satisfy either provision.
225 This will be discussed in more detail at infra notes 228-42 and accompanying
text.
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the liken-often use multiple aliases and lead lives of dissembling
for the very purpose of frustrating attempts by investigators to fully
identify them. It should suffice if the application and order contain
enough identifying information so that the judge can be confident
the agents know to whom they are allowed to listen.227
3. Showing of need. Both the oral and wiretap subdivisions of
section 2518(11) require an application to include a showing of
special need to obtain a roving intercept order. 2 8 The special show-
ing provisions differ somewhat, however, and it seems probable
from the legislative materials and circumstances surrounding the
enactment of the statute that a lesser showing of need is required
for a roving oral intercept order than for a roving wiretap or
electronic communication intercept order.
An application for a roving oral intercept order must contain "a
full and complete statement as to why [specification of the facilities
from which, or the place where, communications are to be inter-
cepted] is not practical," and the order may only be issued if "the
judge finds that such specification is not practical .... "22 A Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee report observes that "[s]ituations where
ordinary specification rules would not be practical would include
those where a suspect moves from room to room in a hotel to
avoid a bug or where a suspect sets up a meeting with another
suspect on a beach or a field."3 0 This comment is useful to a
point, but still leaves unanswered many questions concerning the
scope of the oral roving intercept provision and the type of show-
ing required to satisfy it.
The simplest example of the need for a roving oral intercept
order is what might be called the "single meeting scenario." As-
sume that investigators learn that X, the target of an ongoing
investigation, plans to meet within a few days with Y to finalize
" The Senate Judiciary Committee Report mentions "an alleged terrorist" as
one example. S. REP. No. 541, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 32, reprinted in 1986 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMnm. NEWS 3555, 3586.
- Such information might include nicknames, physical descriptions, and the
like.
22 Subdivision (a) governs oral communications, and subdivision (b) governs
wire or electronic communications. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(11)(a), (b) (Supp. IV 1986).
18 U.S.C. § 2518(11)(a)(ii), (iii) (Supp. IV 1986).
230 S. REP. No. 541, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 32, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODS
CONG. & ADmN. NEws 3555, 3586.
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the details of a crime they have been discussing, but that the
location for the meeting will not be set until just a few hours
before it is to take place. Until the enactment of section 2518(11)
in 1986, law enforcement officials in this situation were forced to
wait until they had probable cause to believe they knew where X
and Y would meet before applying for a court order authorizing
them to bug that particular location.2' As a practical matter it was
often impossible to complete the application process and submit the
application to a judge until long after the meeting had taken place.m
18 U.S.C. § 2518(11)(a) clearly permits the agents to obtain an
intercept order as soon as they learn that the meeting will occur,
even though they do not yet know where.23
The issue of scope arises when more than merely one-time sur-
veillance of one-of-a-kind meetings is involved. Title III permits
judges to issue standard, non-roving interception orders of up to
thirty days' duration.2 Had Congress intended a shorter maximum
duration for roving orders, it would have said so. Yet neither 18
U.S.C. § 2518(11)(a), governing roving oral intercept orders, nor
section 2518(11)(b), governing roving wiretap and electronic com-
munications orders, specify any duration other than thirty days. It
follows, therefore, that if an applicant can show that X, the suspect
under investigation, makes a habit of choosing different locales for
meetings with his coconspirators, a judge may issue a thirty-day
roving oral intercept order.
Suppose the agents have established probable cause to bug X's
office, but have no direct evidence that X uses any other location
to discuss his criminal schemes. May the government nonetheless
seek, and a court issue, a roving oral intercept order? The answer
depends on which of two interpretations of the statutory language
73 This was so because 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b)(ii) requires an application, and
section 2518(4)(b) requires an interception order, to contain a "particular descrip-
tion of the location where communications are to be intercepted."
22 It can take days (and, at an absolute minimum, hours) to draft the papers,
submit them for review, and obtain the necessary approvals. See supra notes 181-
209 and accompanying text.
23 Whether agents would have the technology needed to implement the order
is, of course, a separate question, and is beyond the scope of this Article.
"' 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (Supp. IV 1986).
2- As observed earlier, supra note 233, I will not discuss the practical diffi-
culties agents are likely to encounter in implementing such a court order.
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and legislative history is correct: the "particularlized showing" ap-
proach or the "or wherever clause" approach.
Under the "particularized showing" approach, an application for
a "roving bug" order must make a particularized factual showing
why the standard facilities-or-location specification requirement is
not practical. In other words, the application would have to show
that X has in the past moved from room to room in a hotel to
avoid a bug, or has set up a meeting with another suspect on a
beach or a field, or the like.236
Under the "or wherever clause" approach, authorities are per-
mitted to obtain roving bug authority in every oral intercept order,
so long as the application was first approved by an appropriate
official.237 This view recognizes that, as every experienced investi-
gator knows, although criminals regularly gather in more than one
location to discuss or transact their crimes,28 investigators may not
-have discovered these other locations before submitting the original
oral interception order to a judge.
To fully appreciate the uncertainty whether, with regard to roving
oral intercept orders, the second, broader approach represents the
intent of Congress, let us consider how the statute and legislative
history treat the corresponding question with regard to wiretaps.
The statute requires that an application for a roving wiretap or
electronic communication intercept order make "a showing of a
purpose, on the part of [the person whose communications are to
be intercepted], to thwart interception by changing facilities," and
issuance of such an order is permitted only if "the judge finds
that such purpose has been adequately shown. ' 23 9 In a discussion
of this language immediately following a discussion of the oral
216 These examples are taken from the Senate report quoted at supra note 230.
The terms "'particularized showing' approach" and 'or wherever' approach" are
mine.
Concerning authorization, see supra notes 216-18 and accompanying text.
' It is a common occurrence, for example, for investigators to overhear con-
spirators agree to meet "in Y's hotel room," or "near the ampitheatre in the
park," or even "at the other guy's place, you know, the guy that your guy got
the stuff from the other time." Criminals often speak so cryptically, in an effort
to confuse any investigators who may be listening in, that they themselves cannot
understand what they are talking about.
9 18 U.S.C. § 2518(11)(b)(ii) (Supp. IV 1986).
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provision, the House and Senate Judiciary Committee Reports, in
identical passages, comment:
The rule with respect to "wire communications" is some-
what similar. As indicated in paragraph (b), the applica-
tion must show that the person committing the offense
has a purpose to thwart interception by changing facili-
ties. In these cases, the court must find that the applicant
has shown that such a purpose has been evidenced by the
suspect. An example of a situation which would meet this
test would be an alleged terrorist who went from phone
booth to phone booth numerous times to avoid intercep-
tion. A person whose telephone calls were intercepted who
said that he or she was planning on moving from phone
to phone or to pay phones to avoid detection also would
have demonstrated that purpose. 240
The italicized portions of the above passage highlight Congress'
clear intent to make a particularized, factual showing of need a
prerequisite to a roving wiretap. The absence of similar language
discussing oral communications suggests that such a prerequisite
may not have been intended for a roving oral interception.
One might argue that Congress must have intended the same
standards to apply to all roving interceptions, wire and oral, and
that an explicit requirement of a particularized showing of need
with regard to wiretaps was intended to apply to oral intercepts as
well. But the very fact that the corresponding provision with regard
to roving oral interception orders, and the congressional commit-
tees' discussions of that provision, do not say anything explicit
about a similar requirement, suggests that the committees did not
intend to impose such a requirement on roving oral interception
orders.
A reason did exist, moreover, for imposing more stringent re-
quirements on the wiretapping interception applications. Partici-
- S. REP. No. 541, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 32, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMNm. NEws 3555, 3586; H.R. REP. No. 647, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 53
(identical passages; emphasis added). Neither report discusses roving electronic
communications intercepts, but since section 2518(11)(b) explicitly refers to elec-
tronic as well as wire communications, requirements for the latter should apply
equally to the former.
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pants in the legislative bargaining that produced the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 have informed me that the
particularized "showing of purpose" requirement in section
2518(11)(b)(ii), and the language emphasizing that requirement in
the congressional reports, were added because of concerns expressed
by lobbyists for the nation's telephone companies. These indivi-
duals, who participated actively in the legislative process that re-
sulted in ECPA, wanted statutory protection for their clients, who
might suddenly be told to "wire up" large numbers of pay tele-
phones on short notice. This concern is clearly reflected in section
2518(12), obliging investigators, if at all possible, to specify in the
application and order the telephones likely to be involved, and
authorizing a telephone company to move to quash a roving wire-
tap order that is too burdensome. 24'
In view of this influence, and its nonapplicability to oral inter-
cepts, it is probable that Congress intended to permit Justice De-
partment officials to seek and obtain roving oral intercept orders
even in the absence of the kind of particularized showing of need
that is required for a wiretap. It is not likely, however, that the
issue will be tested in the courts in the forseeable future. If the
Justice Department's track record with the emergency provision is
any indication, 242 the Department will proceed very cautiously with
regard to roving taps and oral intercepts.
4. Description of communications. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b)(iii)
requires each Title III application to contain a "particular descrip-
242 Section 2518(12) provides:
An interception of a communication under an order with respect to
which the requirements of subsections (1)(b)(ii) and (3)(d) of this sec-
tion do not apply by reason of subsection (11) shall not begin until
the facilities from which, or the place where, the communication is to
be intercepted is ascertained by the person implementing the intercep-
tion order. A provider of wire or electronic communications service
that has received an order as provided for in subsection (1l)(b) may
move the court to modify or quash the order on the ground that its
assistance with respect to the interception cannot be performed in a
timely or reasonable fashion. The court, upon notice to the govern-
ment, shall decide such a motion expeditiously.
18 U.S.C. § 2518(12) (Supp. IV 1986). The last two sentences were added by the
Senate; they do not appear in H.R. No. 4952, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), the
House version of what became ECPA. See H.R. REP. No. 647, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. 97 (1986).
242 See supra notes 181-209 and accompanying text.
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tion of the type of communications sought to be intercepted."
Section 2518(4)(c) imposes the same requirement on the interception
order. Without significant exception courts have held that these
requirements are satisfied by a statement including the facilities or
place to be surveilled and the crimes to which such communications
are expected to relate.243 A standard application and order must
also include the identities of the individuals whose communications
are to be intercepted, if known. 2" As interpreted by the Supreme
Court, this latter requirement is not an aspect of particularity,
24s
but serves only lesser purposes.
A roving intercept order, by contrast, need not specify the fa-
cilities or place. 247 Hence, the "particularity" in the description of
communications must be supplied in a different way: the identity
of the individual(s) to be intercepted. Thus, the description could
not be worded in terms of "communications of X and others, as
yet unknown." Rather, the description would have to be expressed
as "communications of X with others" or the like. Such language
emphasizes that there is no authority to listen unless X is in fact
a participant in the conversation.
24 See, e.g., the cases cited in supra note 129.
- 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(I)(b)(iv), (4)(a) (1976). See also supra notes 124-32 and
accompanying text.
24 See supra notes 124-52 and accompanying text.
' See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
It is, however, intended by Congress that even a roving intercept order
specify a reasonably limited geographic area, the number of phones involved, if
known, and the time within which the interception is to be accomplished. See S.
REP. No. 541, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 32, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADmw. NEws 3555, 3586.
- If investigators have probable cause to bug or tap a particular location or
telephone, and also have the basis for a roving intercept order, they could seek
separate orders. The first would be a standard "and others, as yet unknown"
order for the specific location or phone for which probable cause exists, and the
second would be a roving intercept order to cover "communications of X with
others" of other locations or phones. In such a case, applications for each order
should include a statement that the other order is also being sought, particularly
if the two orders are being submitted to different judges.
Alternatively, officials could seek a dual order. Assume that agents obtain a
standard location-specific oral intercept order to bug X's office, and also obtain
authority to conduct a roving oral intercept of X's conversations in other locations
that relate to the crime under investigation. Such an order might authorize (1)
"interception of communications of X and others, as yet unknown, which occur
in X's office at Suite 12, 345 West 57th Street," that relate to the crimes under
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B. Implementation of Roving Intercept Orders
Implementation of a roving intercept order differs from that in-
volving a standard order in at least four respects: the state of
investigators' knowledge about the communication facility or loca-
tion to be monitored, the timing of installation of devices pursuant
to the order, techniques for minimization, and the role of the
telephone company.2 9
1. Knowledge of facilities or location. The first sentence of 18
U.S.C. § 2518(12) provides that interception of oral, wire or elec-
tronic communications pursuant to a section 2518(11) roving inter-
ception order "shall not begin until the facilities from which, or
the place where, the communication is to be intercepted is ascer-
tained by the person implementing the interception order.' '20 On
its face, this passage seems merely to state the obvious principle
that an agent cannot tap a phone, bug a location or monitor a
facility until he knows which phone to tap, which place to bug,
or which facility to monitor. The Senate and House Judiciary Com-
mittee discussions of section 2518(12) make clear, however, that the
language has a significance greater than that. After restating the
statutory language, the reports continue: "In other words, the ac-
tual interception could not begin until the suspect begins or evi-
dences an intention to begin a conversation. ' 251
2. Anticipatory installation of devices. Although actual intercep-
tion may not begin Until the suspect evidences an intent to begin
a conversation, there is nothing in the statute or the House and
Senate report that prohibits the installation of the equipment nec-
essary to intercept such a conversation in advance.212 The Senate
investigation, and (2) "interception of communications of X with others, wherever
they occur," that relate to the crime under investigation.
2,9 Most electronic communications (including, for example, electronic mail and
computerized transmission of data) are transmitted at least in part over telephone
lines. Interception of communications transmitted and received exclusively by radio
likely would not involve telephone companies.
,' The full text of section 2518(12) is set out at supra note 241.
' S. REP. No. 541, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 32, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CoD
CoNo. & ADmin. NEws 3555, 3586. As noted earlier, nowhere does the Report's
discussion of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(11),(12) mention roving interceptions of electronic
communications; legislative gloss on the latter is subsumed in the discussion of
wire communications.
232 The Senate Judiciary Committee Report comments: "It would be improper
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Report's emphasis on the impropriety of "interceptling] all conver-
sations over such phones" suggests that merely installing the taps,
without intercepting conversations over the tapped phones, would
not be improper.2 3 Moreover, the very purpose of the roving in-
tercept provision supports the legality of advance installation of
wiretap equipment. The provision "[is] necessary to cover circum-
stances under which law enforcement officials may not know, until
shortly before the communication, which telephone line will be used
by the person under surveillance." '2 4
The Senate Report stresses the wisdom of including within the
application and order as much information concerning likely tele-
phones as possible because "a telephone company may not be able
to respond instantaneously to an eleventh hour target line desig-
nation. '2 5 It also explicitly encourages "law enforcement officials
to continue the current practice of consulting with telephone com-
pany employees regarding the details of implementation (such as
phone numbers and the specific locations of the telephones) in
advance of the time any order for interception is sought,"2111 a
practice that reduces delays between when an interception order is
issued and when it is implemented. The message seems clear enough:
if the agents can predict in advance which telephones their suspect
is most likely to use, they, and the telephone company, should
install the necessary equipment as soon as the order is issued. 18
U.S.C. § 2518(12) merely makes it clear that before a conversation
to use this expanded specificity order to tap a series of telephones, intercept all
conversations over such phones and then minimize the conversations collected as
a result. This provision puts the burden on the investigation agency to ascertain
when the interception is to take place." S. REP. No. 541, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
32, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmn. NEws 3555, 3586. Careful
study of this report reveals that section 2518(12) does not prohibit, and in fact
affirmatively approves of, other techniques that enhance the usefulness of a roving
wiretap or electronic communication intercept. The report does not mention roving
electronic communication interception orders in its discussion of 18 U.S.C. §§
2518(11)(b), 2518(12). However, since section 2518(11)(b) explicitly governs roving
interception of electronic communications as well as roving wiretaps, however, it
is reasonable to assume that discussion of the latter applies as well to the former.
253 See supra note 252.
25 S. RE'. No. 541, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 31, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADrIN. NEws 3555, 3585.
-5 Id. at 32, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADunv. NEws 3555, 3586.
Id. at 33, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADum. Nnws 3555, 3587.
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on any of the telephones can be intercepted, the burden is on the
investigative agency to ascertain that the person under surveillance
is about to use it.
The general question of whether roving interception orders are
constitutional is deferred until later in this Article. 2 7 It is worth
noting here, however, that advance installation of wiretap equip-
ment does not raise any apparent constitutional concerns. Barring
extraordinary circumstances, the connections required to tap a tele-
phone are never done inside the premises where the phone is lo-
cated. They are done outside, usually at a telephone company fa-
cility. Hence, installing the necessary equipment does not constitute
a physical search and seizure. Nor, if recent Supreme Court dictum
may be relied upon, would this procedure constitute an electronic
"search" of the telephone so long as the agents left the equipment
turned off, and did not listen to or record any conversations on
the tapped telephone. 258
It is logical to assume that section 2518(12), as explained by the
Judiciary Committee Report, applies equally to oral intercepts. In-
deed, in its initial comment, the Committee said as much. 2 9 It is
curious, however, that the rest of the Committee's discussion of
21 See infra notes 284-301 and accompanying text.
211 In United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984), police, acting with the
consent of the seller, installed an electronic tracking device into a container of
chemicals, which was thereafter sold to a person suspected of manufacturing illicit
drugs. In the course of holding that the installation and subsequent sale did not
constitute a Fourth Amendment search, the Court commented:
The mere transfer to Karo of a can containing an unmonitored beeper
infringed no privacy interest. It conveyed no information that Karo
wished to keep private, for it conveyed no information at all. To be
sure, it created a potential for an invasion of privacy, but we have
never held that potential, as opposed to actual, invasions of privacy
constitute searches for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. A holding
to that effect would mean that a policeman walking down the street
carrying a parabolic microphone capable of picking up conversations
in nearby homes would be engaging in a search even if the microphone
were not turned on. It is the exploitation of technological advances
that implicates the Fourth Amendment, not their mere existence.
Karo, 468 U.S. at 712. The analogy of an unmonitored wiretap to the turned-off
parabolic microphone is too obvious to belabor. For an exhaustive discussion of
Karo and related issues, see Fishman, supra note 53.
29 S. REP. No. 541, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 32, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADnmN. NEws 3555, 3586.
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section 2518(12) focuses exclusively on wiretaps. Does this suggest
that the provision should have a different application to oral in-
tercepts than it does to wiretaps? There is little other support for
such a distinction.
Just as agents may not, pursuant to a roving wiretap order,
continuously monitor several telephones on the chance that the
suspect will occasionally use them,2 ° they may not install eaves-
dropping devices in several locations, listen to and record every-
thing that is said in each of them, and then later delete conversations
in which the designated interceptee did not participate. To do so
would clearly be contrary to a fundamental purpose of Title III,
the protection of the privacy of conversations,261 and would prob-
ably violate the Fourth Amendment.
Similarly, the passages in the Report that make it clear that
agents may install wiretaps on likely telephones before the suspect
reveals his intention to use any particular phone on a specific
occasion 26 should apply equally to oral intercepts. The need to
react quickly will often be just as great with regard to oral inter-
cepts as with wiretaps. Just as a telephone company may not be
able to respond to an "eleventh-hour" demand for "target-line
designation," it is often impossible for investigators to install a
listening device in a location at the last minute.
The very purpose of section 2518(11)(a), authorizing roving oral
interception orders, is to enable investigators to react promptly and
effectively when specification of the location of the target conver-
sation is not practical.23 Using the example given in the congres-
sional reports,2 4 if the agents have reason to believe that the suspect
has access to several rooms in the same hotel, and he may move
froma room to room to avoid a bug, the agents should be allowed
to implant listening devices in those rooms pursuant to section
2518(11)(a). Certainly nothing in section 2518(12) or in the House
or Senate Judiciary Committees' discussions of that provision man-
dates to the contrary.
260 See supra note 252.
26, See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 252-58 and accompanying text.
See supra note 212.
S. REP. No. 541, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 32, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CoNr. & ADMN. NEws 3555, 3586.
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There is something more than faintly Orwellian, of course, about
the prospect that law enforcement officials can bug any number of
hotel rooms, offices, or homes, all on the chance that a suspect
might at some point during the authorized interception period choose
to discuss his past, present or future crimes in one of them. Even
accepting that the agents could not legally monitor these bugs until
the suspect identified in the order actually goes inside one of those
locations, there is perhaps no other aspect of Title III, or of any
other legally authorized investigative technique, that has greater po-
tential for abuse. Nevertheless, this is apparently what Congress
has authorized in the roving intercept provision. If this was inten-
tional, rather than inadvertent, it demonstrates considerable faith
in the officials who make law enforcement policy, and those who
implement that policy. Fortunately, the Justice Department's twenty-
year record in employing Title III suggests that that faith is well-
deserved.3"
If anticipatory installation of listening devices can be effected
without physical trespass2" no significant constitutional questions
are raised. The anticipatory installation of listening devices inside
a private location, on the other hand, raises far more difficult
questions because of the need to make physical entry, an act which
itself has always been considered a search. 267 Such entries, unless
authorized by a valid warrant, are presumptively unlawful. 268
Whether a roving intercept order may validly authorize physical
265 Except for the numerous Title III orders ruled invalid for Giordano-type
violations that occurred during the tenure of John Mitchell as Attorney General,
discussed at supra notes 140-41, the government's use of Title III has been upheld
in the overwhelming majority of cases in which an application, warrant or the
conduct of a court-authorized interception has been challenged. Moreover, the
caution with which the government has utilized the already existing emergency
surveillance provision, discussed at supra notes 20, 205-08, suggests that the roving
interception provisions will be utilized only very rarely.
2" An example would be the use of a parabolic microphone, see supra note
258, which is put into place but not monitored until police acquire information
that the named suspect is "on location."
26 See, e.g., United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715-16 (1984); Welsh v.
Wisconsin, 446 U.S. 740, 748-49 (1984); Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204,
211-12 (1981); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980). Bugs raise more
difficult questions than wiretaps because the latter generally do not require a
physical entry.
2" Each of the cases cited supra note 267 so holds.
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entrance into a private location that the order does not "particu-
larly describe" in any traditional sense, is discussed subsequently.2
3. Minimization. As we have seen, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(12) pro-
vides that, when executing a roving interception order, investigators
cannot begin monitoring "until the suspect begins or evidences an
intention to begin a conversation." ' 70 Continuous monitoring while
waiting for the suspect to arrive at the target location is prohib-
ited. 271 The roving interception provisions are silent as to minimi-
zation practices to be followed once the suspect is known to be at
that location. In the absence of explicit provisions, the most logical
inference is that Congress intended the general minimization pro-
vision, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5),272 to apply.
With regard to wiretaps, once agents have a valid reason to
believe that their suspect is "on site," they should be permitted to
monitor all phone calls for a brief period to determine whether the
suspect named in the order is one of the conversants. If he is, they
may continue to monitor the call, subject to standard minimization
requirements. 273 If the suspect is not a participant, they should
cease monitoring, although they would be justified in spot-
monitoring274 the call periodically to determine whether the suspect
has become a participant. If he has, they should continue to mon-
itor the call for as long as he is on the line.
Similar procedures should apply to minimizing a roving oral in-
tercept. Once agents learn that their suspect is inside the target
location, they should be permitted to monitor all conversations that
occur within the suspect's probable range of hearing, even if the
suspect does not say anything, since even a person's silence in a
non-custodial interrogation setting may be revealing of guilty in-
volvement or knowledge. 27s If the "roving bug" is in a private
premises and the agents cannot see whether the suspect is in the
26 See infra notes 302-07 and accompanying text.
'10 See supra note 251.
2' See supra note 252.
- inimization is discussed at supra notes 150-58 and accompanying text.
73 See supra notes 150-58.
-1 See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
21- See, e.g., U.S. v. Giese, 597 F.2d 1180, 1185-96 (9th Cir. 1979); U.S. v.
Williams, 577 F.2d 188, 194 (2d Cir. 1978); U.S. v. Kilbourne, 559 F.2d 1263,
1265 (4th Cir. 1977); U.S. v. Gala, 544 F.2d 940, 946 (8th Cir. 1976).
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room covered by the device, the only practical option is for the
monitors to make a good-faith determination whether the suspect
is likely to be in the room or not, and to spot monitor frequently
if he apparently is not present when the surveillance commences.
Similarly, officers executing a roving electronic communication
interception order should not intercept any communications over a
particular facility unless they have reason to believe that their sus-
pect is transmitting or receiving an electronic communication over
that facility. When such is the case, they should minimize as with
any electronic communication.27 6
4. Telephone company cooperation. It is difficult to effectively
implement a wiretap or interception of electronic communications
without cooperation of the telephone company or other communi-
cations service which services the targeted telephone or other com-
munication facility. Accordingly, the final paragraph of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2518(4) provides that any Title III interception order may direct
telephone companies, landlords, and the like to cooperate with the
implementation of such an order.
Implementation of a roving wiretap or electronic communication
interception order will often be impossible without cooperation of
the telephone company that services the phones in question. The
question of telephone company cooperation was the focus of con-
siderable attention when sections 2518(11), (12) were drafted. 277 This
concern is reflected in the statute and in the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee Report. 278
The Senate Report specifically encourages law enforcement offi-
cials to consult with telephone company employees prior to sub-
mitting a wiretap application to obtain information they will need
to implement a wiretap order once it is issued, 279 and this is in
fact common practice. The Senate Report also made it clear that
276 The Senate report notes that somewhat different procedures would have to
be followed in minimizing electronic communications. S. REP. No. 541, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 31, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CoNo. & ADmN. NEws 3555,
3585. See also C. FIsHm", supra note 12, § 159.2.
27 See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
78 The House report contains no discussion of telephone company cooperation,
but the Senate report does. Compare H.R. REP. No. 647, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
97 (1986) with S. REP. No. 541, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1986).
219 S. REP. No. 541, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 33, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMhn. NEws 3555, 3582.
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the judge to whom a roving tap application is submitted should,
in deciding whether to issue the order, consider whether the appli-
cation and proposed order specify a reasonably limited geographic
area, the number of phones and phone numbers involved, if known,
and the time within which the interception is to be accomplished."
The Senate added a second sentence to the House version of
section 2518(12) which permits "[a] provider of wire or electronic
communications that has received an order [for a roving wiretap
to] move the court to modify or quash the order on the ground
that its assistance with respect to the interception cannot be per-
formed in a timely or reasonable fashion."2'8 The final sentence of
section 2518(12) directs that "[tihe court, upon notice to the gov-
ernment, shall decide such a motion expeditiously. "m The failure
to specify number of telephones, geographic area, and phone num-
bers in the application and order "may be considered evidence of
unreasonableness or untimeliness by a court acting upon a tele-
phone company motion made pursuant to [section 2518(12)]."83
C. Constitutionality of the Roving Intercept Provision
1. In general. The Fourth Amendment directs that "no warrants
shall issue" which fail to "particularly describ[e] the place to be
searched." The basic argument in favor of the constitutionality
of the roving intercept provision is that the provision does not
unconstitutionally waive the particularity requirement, it merely de-
scribes the "place" to be searched in a somewhat untraditional but
Id. at 32, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMN. NEws 3555, 3581.
A stated purpose for this is "so as not to render telephone company cooperation
technically infeasible." Id.
1' 18 U.S.C. § 2518(12) (Supp. IV 1986). Section 2518(12) is quoted in its
entirety supra note 241.
Id. The Senate Judiciary Committee Report comments:
This provision recognizes that a telephone company may not be able
to respond instantaneously to an eleventh hour target line designation.
It is designed to account for the practicalities of telephone company
response time, the number of phones that may be covered by the
order, and the geographic area of the target lines that may be used
by the person under surveillance.
S. REP. No. 541, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 32, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CoNGC.
& ADDm. NEws 3555, 3581.
Id. at 33, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & Anmsi. NEws 3555, 3582.
" See supra note 24 for the full text of the Fourth Amendment.
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still sufficiently particular way. The description is not a specific
phone or facility or location, rather any phone, facility or location
X uses at a particular time. The particular description simply fol-
lows X from place to place. Agents may monitor a particular
phone, location or facility, however, only if and when they rea-
sonably believe that X is about to or is presently conversing or
communicating on that particular phone, location or facility. 25
How does this argument measure up against existing Fourth
Amendment case law? There is, of course, no Supreme Court de-
cision directly on point. Two decisions address situations that can
be considered somewhat analogous, however: United States v.
Steagald28 6 and United States v. Karo.1s 7 Unfortunately, they point
in opposite directions.
Karo appears to support the constitutionality of the roving in-
terception provision. There, the Court held that a warrant is usually
required before the authorities may monitor the presence of an
electronic tracking device inside someone's home or other private
location.u8 The Court went out of its way to state, however, that
such a warrant would not have to specify in advance the place to
be electronically "searched" by the device. 2 9 It would suffice if
application and warrant described the device, the object into which
it is installed, and the reasons underlying the use of the device.20
If such a warrant is constitutionally permissible in the context of
electronic tracking devices, why not in the context of listening de-
vices as well?
The argument against the Karo analogy is simple to state and
difficult to refute. First, Karo involved a "beepered" object the
location of which was the very information that was sought; in a
roving interception, the location is determined before the search
occurs. Second, the electronic search in Karo is far less intrusive
285 See supra notes 250-69 and accompanying text.
26 451 U.S. 204 (1981).
-1 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
288 Id. at 717. In Karo, a beeper was hidden in a drum of chemicals. For a
detailed discussion of Karo and related issues see Fishman, supra note 53.
29 Karo, 468 U.S. at 718.
280 Id. Congress has since incorporated this dictum into legislation as part of
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986. See 18 U.S.C. § 3117 (Supp.
IV 1986).
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than a traditional search and seizure, revealing only whether the
beepered object is inside the location being monitored. The elec-
tronic "search" involved in a wiretap or eavesdrop, by contrast, is
far more intrusive than a physical entry and search, by virtue of
its surreptitious nature, its durations', and the information it re-
veals.m Thus, the Karo dictum, though easing the particularity
requirement, provides at best an imperfect analogy to, and hence
only limited support for, the roving intercept clause.
The reasoning of Steagald, moreover, supports the conclusion
that the roving intercept clause is not constitutional. In Steagald,
Drug Enforcement Administration agents had obtained a warrant
authorizing the arrest of a man named Lyons. The agents entered
and searched Steagald's home, believing Lyons was hiding there.
In the course of their search, they did not find Lyons, but did
find cocaine and other evidence incriminating Steagald, and they
charged him with possession. The Supreme Court ruled that the
entry and subsequent search of Steagald's home was unlawful. The
mere fact that the agents possessed an arrest warrant for Lyons
"did absolutely nothing to protect [Steagald's] privacy interest in
being free from an unreasonable invasion and search of his
home."2 93 Hence, from Steagald's perspective, the search "was no
more reasonable ... than it would have been if conducted in the
absence of any warrant." '  Evidence incriminating Steagald was
therefore suppressed. 95
The analogy between Steagald and a roving intercept order is
clear enough. The mere fact that officials have a court order au-
thorizing the interception of X's telephone conversations does not
protect Y's privacy interest in being free from an unreasonable
invasion and search of his phone. This would be true even if the
police developed probable cause to believe that X was using Y's
2 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (Supp. IV 1986) permits interception orders of up to
30 days duration.
See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
-' Steagald, 451 U.S. 204, 213 (1981).
Id. at 216.
2 Id. at 205-06. Had the police found Lyons in Steagald's home and seized
evidence that incriminated Lyons, that evidence would have been suppressed only
if the courts found that the seizure violated Lyons' rights. See generally W.
LAFAvE, 3 SrEacH A SEIZuRE §§ 11.3, 11.4 (2d ed. 1987).
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telephone. The Fourth Amendment requires that, barring exigent
circumstances, the determination of probable cause must be made
by a "detached and neutral magistrate" prior to entry.9 6
Yet the Steagald analogy is also imperfect. Entry into a third
person's home to search for someone named in an arrest warrant
is much more intrusive than a properly minimized roving intercept
order. When agents enter to make an arrest, objects come into
plain view that are not visible to those outside. If the person sought
does not immediately surrender, the intrusion intensifies as police
search from room to room, and even if the arrestee promptly gives
himself up, police may conduct a security sweep of the premises. 2n
In a roving intercept wiretap, on the other hand, no intrusion at
all occurs until the police actually monitor the phone, 298 and the
monitorin& is authorized only when the police reasonably believe
that X is using or is about to use the phone. Even then, they may
monitor only those conversations in which X participates, only spot-
monitoring others. 29 Thus, Steagald may be as easily distinguished
from roving intercept orders as Karo.
In addition, there are three other arguments supporting the con-
stitutionality of roving intercept orders. First, in at least some in-
stances, the need to intercept conversations may arise in
circumstances that may be deemed constitutionally "exigent," and
the roving intercept would be constitutional under the exigent cir-
cumstances doctrine even without Title III authorization.?3 Thus,
the roving intercept provision, far from being unconstitutional, may
be viewed as a congressional decision to impose more stringent
standards on a particular class of surveillance than the Constitution
would otherwise require. Second, flexibility in interpreting the Con-
stitution should not be one-sided. If the Fourth Amendment is
flexible enough to protect privacy against technological develop-
See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449 (1971) (attorney
general in charge of investigation not a detached and neutral magistrate); Johnson
v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948) (opium fumes in hallway not sufficient
to allow warrantless search).
In Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589 (1980), the Court acknowledged
that law enforcement officials might sometimes need to conduct such sweeps.
29 See supra notes 257-58 and acompanying text.
See supra notes 270-76 and accompanying text.
100 See supra notes 32-91 and accompanying text for a discussion of the exigent
circumstances doctrine.
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ments far beyond the contemplation of the founding fathers, as it
should be, then it also must be flexible enough to permit investi-
gators to preserve the basic mandate of the amendment's particu-
larity requirement in novel ways. The roving intercept provision is
an ingenious and carefully drawn legislative scheme that does just
that. Finally, in a close case, a presumption in favor of the con-
stitutionality of congressional legislation should tip the balance."'
2. Surreptitious Entry. As noted earlier, all non-warrant au-
thorized entries onto private premises are presumptively invalid in-
trusions into privacy.3 2 Surreptitious entry to install a listening
device is even more intrusive. Yet in Dalia v. United States," the
Supreme Court held that in implementing court-authorized eaves-
dropping at a particularly described location, law enforcement of-
ficials may surreptitiously break into and enter the location to install
listening devices, even though the Title III court order did not
explicitly authorize such entry.304 Although Dalia involved a loca-
tion-specific order, much of the reasoning in the case appears to
validate surreptitious entry conducted pursuant to the roving inter-
ception provision. 35 Beyond Dalia, the arguments in favor of con-
stitutional validity discussed previously 3 6 are also generally applicable
when surreptitious entry is necessary to carry out an oral roving
intercept.3 7
-1 The Court has often cited this general principle. See, e.g., United States v.
Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 415-16 (1976) (upholding statute authorizing postal officers
to make warrantless searches).
See supra notes 268-69 and accompanying text.
3 441 U.S. 238 (1979).
The Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not outlaw surreptitious
entry per se, id. at 24748, that Title III implicitly permits covert entry, since
Congress must have been aware that such entry is sometimes necessary to imple-
ment an oral intercept order, id. at 249-54, that the Fourth Amendment does not
require a Title III order to explicitly authorize such entry, id. at 255-58, and that
while the Fourth Amendment and Title III leave it to law enforcement discretion
to decide how a court order is to be executed, the reasonableness of their actions
ultimately is subject to judicial review at a suppression hearing, id. at 258-59. For
a critique of Dalia, see Goldsmith, supra note 137, at 112-18.
See the outline of the Dalia decision in supra note 304.
See supra notes 284-301 and accompanying text.
The counter arguments to the Steagald analogy at supra notes 297-99 and
accompanying text, based on intrusiveness of the search, obviously do not apply
to surreptitious entries.
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V. OTHER WESTERN DEMOCRACIES: A COMPARISON
The challenge of balancing the needs of effective law enforcement
and the protection of individual privacy is not one faced only by
the United States. All democratic nations devoted to civil liberties
and individual privacy face basically the same dilemma. It may
prove helpful, therefore, to consider how three such nations, Can-
ada, Israel and West Germany, 3 8 regulate wiretapping and eaves-
dropping in general, and in particular how they regulate such
surveillance in exigent circumstances. The following review of Ca-
nadian, Israeli and West German law deals exclusively with statu-
tory regulation of wiretapping and eavesdropping for law
enforcement purposes. Use of such surveillance in defense of na-
tional security raises entirely different issues, which are beyond the
scope of this Article.
A. Canada
1. The statute in outline. Canada's "Interception of Commu-
nications" law is in many respects substantially similar to Title
III.109 A court order is required to authorize the interception of all
"private communications. "10 Such orders, labeled "authoriza-
tions," may be obtained only to investigate specified serious felo-
nies. 31' An application for an interception order must be signed by
the Solicitor General of Canada, or by the Attorney General of
101 In Great Britain, wiretapping is regulated administratively; no judicial over-
sight occurs. See TmE INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN, 1980,
C ND. No. 7873 (a "white paper" issued by the British government detailing the
procedures followed there). Because of the absence of judicial participation, an
analysis of British procedures is not included here. For an overview, see Note,
Secret Surveillance and the European Convention on Human Rights, 33 STAN. L.
REv. 1113, 1122-29 (1981).
119 See TREmEAR's CRQIINAL CODE §§ 178.1-.23 (1988).
110 Communications are protected only if the conversants have a reasonable
expectation that what they say is not being intercepted. TnwEam's CluM. CODE
§ 178.1 (1988) (definition of "private communication"). This provision closely
parallels the Title III definition of "oral communication," 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2)
(Supp. IV 1986). A person is not protected from the interception of his com-
munications if another party to a communication consents. TREAMER'S CRIM. CODE
§§ 178.11(2)(a), (b), (3) (1988). This provision is substantially identical to 18
U.S.C. §§ 2511(2)(c), (d) (Supp. IV 1986).
'" ThEMEaR's CRim. CODE § 178.1 (1988) (definition of "offense"). The cor-
responding Title III provision is 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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the province in which the application is made, or by an agent
specially designated in writing by one of those officials. 12
The application must specify the facts relied upon to justify the
issuance of an interception order,3 13 the type of private communi-
cations sought to be intercepted, 314 the "names, addresses and oc-
cupations, if known, of all persons, the interception of whose private
communications there are reasonable and probable grounds to be-
lieve may assist the investigation of the offense," ' 315 and a statement
as to all previous applications made in connection with any targets
named in the current application.316 If a prior application had been
withdrawn or rejected, this information must also be included, to-
gether with the name of the judge to whom the prior application
had been made.317 Further, the application must state whether other
investigative procedures have been tried and have failed, or why
they are unlikely to succeed if tried .31
A judge may issue such an order only if he or she is satisfied
that the application makes adequate factual showings. 319 A special
showing of need is required to authorize interception of conversa-
tions between a solicitor and client, and the judge is empowered
to insert into the order special provisions protecting privileged com-
munications. 320 The order must specify the offense involved, the
type of communication to be intercepted, the targeted individuals
and locations, if known, and must generally describe how the in-
terceptions are to be achieved.321 In issuing the authorization, the
judge may impose conditions he or she "considers advisable in the
312 Id. § 178.12(1) (which corresponds closely to 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516(l),(2) (1982
& Supp. IV 1986)).
3 Id. § 178.12(1)(c).
3, Id. § 178.12(1)(d) (compare 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b)(iii) (Supp. IV 1986)).
31- Id. § 178.12(1)(e) (apparently the equivalent of the Title III probable cause
requirement).
316 Id. § 178.12(1)(e.1) (corresponding to 18 U.S.C. § 2518(I)(e) (Supp. IV
1986)).
317Id.
319 Id. § 178.12(1)(g) (substantially identical to 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c) (1982)).
319 Id. § 178.13(1) (substantially identical to 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (1982 & Supp.
IV 1986)).
3- Id. §§ 178.13(1.1), (1.2). Title III has no provisions corresponding to these.
321 Id. §§ 178.13(2)(a), (b), (c) (18 U.S.C. § 2518(4) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)
is similar in most respects).
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public interest. ' ' 322 An order may authorize interceptions for up to
sixty days. 32 Renewals are permitted, but only upon an additional
factual showing of continued need and of progress made to date.324
The Canadian statute contains an exclusionary rule similar to that
included in Title III.325 Privileged communications are protected
from improper disclosure.126 Within ninety days of the completion
of interception, the targets of the surveillance must be notified that
their communications were intercepted, except that postponements
of notice are permitted upon a showing of good cause.3 27 Premature
or unauthorized disclosure may be punished by up to two years'
imprisonment. 328 Before an intercepted communication may be of-
fered in evidence, adequate notice of the prosecutor's intent to do
so must be provided. 329
The Canadian statute thus reflects the same concerns, and em-
ploys many of the same mechanisms, as Title III. There are, how-
ever, significant differences. Canada's law contains no minimization
provision, for example, and it is more difficult for a Canadian
3- Id. § 178.13(2)(d) (corresponding to 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (1982 & Supp. IV
1986)).
I3 d. § 178.13(2)(e). The corresponding period in Title III is 30 days. 18
U.S.C. § 2518(5) (Supp. IV 1986). In Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59
(1967), the Supreme Court held that 60 days was too lengthy a period to permit
surveillance based upon a single showing of probable cause.
32 TmEAR's CRIM. CODE §§ 178.13(3), (4) (1988) (corresponding to 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2518(1)(f), (5) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
3- Id. § 178.16(1). The statute limits, however, the application and impact of
the "fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine," id. §§ 178.16(1), (2), and permits a
judge to admit into evidence communications intercepted pursuant to a statutorily
imperfect order if the imperfection is "only ... a defect of form or an irregularity
in procedure," rather than a "substantive defect or irregularity." Id. § 178.16(3).
This provision corresponds to the judicially-created rule in the United States that
violations of aspects of Title III that were intended to play a substantial role in
limiting the use of electronic surveillance require suppression of evidence, but
violation of less significant provisions does not require suppression of evidence.
United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 527 (1974); United States v. Chavez,
416 U.S. 562, 571-72, 579-80 (1974).
26 Tn MEAR's CRIm. CODE § 178.16(5) (1988) (corresponding to 18 U.S.C. §
2517(4) (Supp. IV 1986)).
127 Id. § 178.23 (corresponding to 18 U.S.C § 2518(8)(d).
'2 Id. § 178.2(1) (corresponding to 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (1982 & Supp. IV
1986), which imposes up to five years' imprisonment).
I d. §§ 178.16(4), 178.17 (corresponding to 18 U.S.C. § 2518(9) (Supp. IV
1986)).
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defendant to challenge the adequacy of a court order and the
application submitted in support thereof.33 Two additional distinc-
tions are particularly pertinent to the question of exigent surveil-
lance. First, Canada's statute has a "basket clause" that is similar
to, but broader than, the Title III roving intercept provision. Sec-
ond, Canada has an emergency surveillance provision that is dif-
ferent in some respects.
2. The locational "basket clause." The standard Title III appli-
cation and order must contain "a particular description of the
nature and location of the facilities from which or the place where
communication is to be intercepted. ' ' 331 Canada's statute, by con-
trast, requires an application to provide only "a general description
of the nature and location of the place, if known, at which private
communications are proposed to be intercepted ... ."332 Similarly,
the order need only "generally describe the place at which private
communications may be intercepted, if a general description of that
place can be given." 33
Relying upon this language, Canadian officials frequently seek
and receive judicial authorization to intercept communications of
specified individuals at specified locations, and, in addition, au-
thorization to intercept the communications of those individuals at
any other location within the jurisdiction of the court that are
"resorted to or used by" the specified individuals. 334 Such a pro-
vision in the order, which Canadian courts bluntly refer to as a
"basket clause," has been upheld by every court that has consid-
ered the issue.3"1
33 Id. § 178.14. This and other aspects of the Canadian statute have inspired
considerable criticism and debate in Canada. See, e.g., Denton, Crossed Wires,
Lax Laws Make Canada a Nation of Eavesdroppers, Wash. Post, Feb. 7, 1987,
at A37, col. 1.
331 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b)(ii) (Supp. IV 1986) (emphasis added). See also id.
§ 2518(4)(b), which requires an interception order to "specify ... the nature and
location of" the phone to be tapped or the place to be bugged.
332 TR.mEAR's CmRm. CODE § 178.12(I)(e) (1988) (emphasis added).
3 Id. § 178.13(1.2)(c) (emphasis added).
334 Regina v. Newall, 136 D.L.R.3d 734, 745 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1982). Each of
the cases cited in supra notes 335-36 discusses an order with similar language.
331 See, e.g., Regina v. Ritch, 69 C.C.C.2d 288, 293-95 (Alta. App. 1982);
Regina v. Newall, 67 C.C.C.2d 459, 463-65 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1982); Regina v. Biasi,
62 C.C.C.2d 304, 311-13 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1981); Regina v. Lyons, 52 C.C.C.2d
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The parallels between the Canadian "basket clause" and the new
roving interception provision of Title III are not completely coin-
cidental. Indeed, the Canadian provision probably was at least in
part the inspiration for the 1986 amendment to Title 111.336 There
are only two significant differences. First, the basket clause is au-
tomatically included in a Canadian court order whenever the pros-
ecutor seeks it, while an application for a roving intercept must be
specially approved and specially justified.337 Second, Canadian of-
ficials use the basket clause provision on a regular basis, while
American officials in all likelihood will not regularly use roving
intercepts. 338
3. The emergency surveillance provision. If an investigator be-
lieves that a compelling need exists to intercept communications
before an application for authorization can be processed that com-
plies with statutory procedures, and if he is authorized in writing
by the Solicitor General of Canada or by the Attorney General of
a province, the investigator may apply to a specially designated
judge for written authority to intercept communications for up to
thirty-six hours. 3 9 Communications intercepted pursuant to this
113, 119-20, 124-25 (Vancouver County Ct., B.C., 1979); Regina v. Vrany, 46
C.C.C.2d 14, 19-20, 23 (Ont. App. 1979); Regina v. Niles, 40 C.C.C.2d 512, 514
(Ont. App. 1978). But see Regina v. Blacquiere, 57 C.C.C.2d 330, 337-38 (P.E.I.
Sup. Ct. 1980) (holding that either the person or place must be known). The
courts are divided, however, as to whether an intercepted communication itself
suffices to show that the targeted individuals "resorted to" a location other than
that specified in the authorization, or whether it is necessary to show that the
authorities had evidence independent of and preceeding the interception justifying
a belief that the suspect "resorted to" a location not specified in the order. Of
the cases cited in this note, Newall and Biasi hold that the interception itself
suffices; Vrany suggests likewise. Lyons and Niles, by contrast, hold that the
prosecution cannot use the communication itself to prove that the targets "resorted
to" the telephone in question, because evidence that the targets resorted to that
telephone is necessary to show that the police were lawfully tapping that previously
undesignated telephone in the first place.
116 Officials in the Justice Department and on the staff of the President's
Commission on Organized Crime, for which I acted as a consultant until the
Commission was "defunded" out of existence in 1986, were well aware of the
Canadian "basket clause" in 1985-1986. It was during this period that various
legislative proposals were taking shape that now make up the Electronic Com-
munications Privacy Act of 1986.
117 See supra notes 215.48 and accompanying text.
"I See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
119 TzEm:EAR's CaRw. CoDE § 178.15(2) (1988).
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procedure are admissible only if the judge subsequently certifies
that, had an application been submitted to him under the regular
procedures, he would have granted the application.34
Viewed in isolation, this provision seems more demanding in
several respects than 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7), but in context it is not.
Both statutes require approval by a high prosecutorial official, but
the Canadian statute also requires judicial approval and permits
emergency surveillance for a shorter period of time.34 The Cana-
dian provision apparently does not, however, require the submission
of a statutorily satisfactory retroactive application, as does Title
III.342 Further, Canada's "basket clause" provision greatly reduces
the need to invoke the emergency surveillance provision. The latter
seems to apply only where an entirely new investigation is to be
commenced that does not involve individuals who are the targets
of an existing interception authorization. Thus, on the whole the
Canadian statutory scheme gives law enforcement personnel a lat-
itude in intercepting communications that is at least as broad as
that of Title III.
B. Israel
Israel's statute 3 covers both eavesdropping and wiretapping.3
Anyone who secretly monitors a conversation without lawful au-
thority may be punished by up to three years imprisonment.34 Such
monitoring for law enforcement purposes4 6 is lawful only if a court
- Id. § 178.15(3).
34 The Canadian statute permits emergency surveillance for 36 hours, id. §
178.15(2), while Title III allows 48 hours, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7) (Supp. IV 1986).
See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7) (Supp. IV 1986).
- 33 L.S.I. 141 (5739-1979) (5739 is the year in the Hebrew calendar; 1979,
the year in the secular calendar). All citations in the following analysis refer to
an unofficial translation of the Israeli statute which appears at Note, Digest:
Recent Legislation and Cases, 15 IsRAEL L. REv. 131, 144-53 (1980).
- 33 L.S.I. 141 § (5739-1979) 1 defines "listening" as listening to the con-
versation of another by means of a device, "eavesdropping" as listening without
the consent of any of the parties to the conversation, and "conversation" as
conversation by word of mouth or other means of communication.
345 Id. § 2(a).
-" The statute also regulates monitoring for purposes of state security. Id. §
4. This provision is distinct from those regulating law enforcement monitoring,
and is therefore beyond the scope of this study.
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order, or "permit", is issued by the President of a District Court.3 47
The application for such an order must be submitted in writing by
a police officer of the rank of nitzav mishne (approximately colo-
nel) or higher, who has been authorized to do so by the Inspector-
General of Police. 348
The judge may issue a permit "if he is satisfied that it is nec-
essary to do so to prevent offenses or detect offenders. 3 49 The
permit "shall indicate the identity of the person whose conversa-
tions may be listened to, and the place and type of such conver-
sations, if these data are known in advance; it shall also specify
the permitted modes of listening." 3 50 Such a permit is valid for no
more than three weeks. 351
The statute prohibits the secret monitoring of privileged com-
munications. 352 It also contains an explicit exclusionary rule,353 which
is noteworthy in the Israeli context because the Israeli legislature
(Knesset) and courts have rejected the concept of an exclusionary
rule generally.3 4 Further, conversations lawfully recorded pursuant
to the statute are admissible only "as evidence in a criminal pro-
ceeding not arising out of a private complaint. '355
A comparison of Israel's statute to Title III thus reveals signif-
icant similarities. The decision to seek a court permit must be made
by a highly placed government official. Monitoring must be of
limited duration. It may be used only to investigate criminal of-
fenses. Conversations intercepted in violation of the statute are not
admissible in evidence.
34 Id. § 6(a). Israel is divided into six administrative districts. Its trial court
system is two-tiered, consisting of magistrate's court and district court, the latter
being the higher of the two.
318 Id. §§ 1, 6(a) (5739-1979). Although the Inspector-General of Police may
authorize an application for a monitoring permit on his own authority, he is
required to report monthly to the Minister of the Interior concerning the permits
issued, and the terms of those permits. The Minister of the Interior, in turn, is
required to transmit a copy of these reports every three months to the Minister
of Justice. Id. § 6(0.
39 Id. § 6(a).
I" Id. § 6(d) (emphasis added).
3 Id. § 6(e).
352 33 L.S.I. 141 § 9 (5739-1979).
3' Id. § 13(a).
154 See generally Zaltzman, The Israeli Approach to Evidence Obtained in Vi-
olation of the Right to Privacy, 18 ISRAL L. Rv. 215 (1983).
355 33 L.S.I. 141 § 13(c) (5739-1979).
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There are, however, significant differences. 3 6 Use of wiretapping
and eavesdropping is not limited to specified crimes. 37 The statute
does not specify the factual showing required to satisfy the judge
that the permit "is necessary ... to prevent offenses or detect
offenders. ' 358 It contains no minimization provision. Further, like
Canada's statute but unlike Title III, there is no rigid requirement
that the application or permit specify the locations or facilities to
be tapped or bugged. 359 Such information is to be included only if
it is known at the time of the application. 3w0
Israel's statute contains an emergency surveillance provision which,
like 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7), allows such surveillance without prior
judicial approval. The permit for such surveillance may be issued
by the Inspector General of Police, if that official is satisfied that
the surveillance "must be carried out without delay in order to
prevent, or detect the perpetrators of, a felony" before a judicial
permit can be obtained.36' This permit must be in writing and must
contain the same information a judicially issued permit would con-
tain. 367 It is valid for a maximum of forty-eight hours. 36 Upon
issuing such a permit, the Inspector General must "forthwith notify
the Minister of the Interior to such effect in writing, and the
Minister of the Interior may cancel the permit. ' ' 364 Like Title III,
the Israeli statute provides that communications intercepted pursu-
ant to emergency surveillance are admissible in a subsequent trial
only if retroactive approval of the permit is obtained from the
president of a district court.36
3- In assessing these differences, it is important to remember that Israel's
government is more centralized than that of the United States or Canada, that
its boundaries include only 8,302 square miles (excluding the West Bank and Gaza
Strip), and that its estimated population in 1985 was 4.23 million, EuRoMomTOR
PUBLICATIONS LIMITED, INTERNATIONAL MARKETING DATA AND STATIsTIcs 1987/88
4 (12th ed. 1987).
357 See supra note 349 and accompanying text.
35- 33 L.S.I. 141 § 6(a) (5739-1979).
319 See supra note 350 and accompanying text.
33 L.S.I. 141 § 6(a) (5739-1979).
361 Id. § 7(a).
3-2 See supra note 350.
3-5 33 L.S.I. 141 § 7(a) (5739-1979).
3- Id. § 7(b). The Minister of the Interior must transmit copies of the noti-
fication to the Minister of Justice every three months. Id.
'35 Id. §" 7(c).
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C. West Germany
Wiretapping for law enforcement purposes in West Germany is
regulated by sections 100a-101 of the German Criminal Procedure
Code (Strafprozessordnung)A" Such wiretapping is lawful only if
conducted pursuant to court order, which a judge may issue only
if an application relates facts which "justify the suspicion that
someone ... committed" certain serious crimes,36 7 The order may
be obtained either to investigate the crime or to locate a suspect,3 6
so long as "establishing the facts or establishing the whereabouts
of the accused in any other manner would be futile or rendered
considerably more difficult. '"369
The statute is silent as to which officials may apply for a wiretap
order, although it provides that, upon receipt of such an order,
the German Postal Service "shall make it possible for the judge,
the public prosecutor, and their assistant civil servants of the police
forces" to conduct the wiretap by providing the necessary technical
assistance and facilities. 370 Thus, the statute apparently contemplates
prosecutorial direction and control over the process, and this ap-
parently is how things have worked out in practice.3 71
The wiretap order must be in writing, and must "contain the
name and address of the person against whom it is directed, '3 72 as
'6 STPO §§ 100a-101 (1968). The analysis that follows is based upon a trans-
lation of the statute provided to me by the President's Commission on Organized
Crime. There is apparently no regulation of eavesdropping (bugging). The same
legislation that enacted STPO §§ 100a-101 also regulates wiretapping for national
security purposes. The latter provisions are entirely separate from those relating
to law enforcement, however, and are beyond the scope of this study. For a more
detailed analysis of the West German statute and its use, see Carr, Wiretapping
in West Germany, 29 AM. J. Cobip. L. 607 (1981).
167 STPO §§ 100a-no.l(a)-(d) (1968).
6 Id. § 100a.
369 Id. The provision therefore appears akin to 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(1)(c),(3)(c)
(1982), which require a Title III application to demonstrate that ordinary inves-
tigative procedures have been tried and failed, or would be unlikely to succeed if
tried, or that ordinary procedures would be too dangerous.
370 STPO § 100b(III) (1968).
37 Professor Carr reports that the West German federal prosecutor's office
follows a practice of centralized evaluation and review of applications before they
are submitted to a judge. Carr, supra note 366, at 619-20. There is apparently
little centralization with regard to applications submitted by West German state
prosecutors. Id. at 620.
372 STPO § 100b(II) (1968).
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well as the "type, extent, and duration of the measures" that are
authorized.37 3 Such an order may be directed not only against some-
one suspected of the crime being investigated,3 74 but also against
"persons who, on the basis of certain facts, are suspected of ac-
cepting information that comes from the suspect, or of passing it
on, or of having the accused use their [telephone or teletype] line."3 5
The telephone or teletype lines of such "contact persons" may be
tapped even if they are innocent associates of the target and are
not themselves suspected of complicity.376 It is unclear whether the
court order must name the specific "contact persons" whose lines
may be tapped, or whether an order can grant general authorization
to tap the lines of "contact persons" as investigators identify them.
If the latter, the West German "contact person" provision is even
broader and more permissive in scope than Canada's "basket
clause" provision.3"
Like Title III, West Germany's statute requires that at least those
who were named in the court order must eventually receive notice
of the fact that their lines have been tapped.3" The wiretap order
may have a maximum duration of three months, and may be re-
newed provided the requisite conditions still exist.3"
Unlike Title III, the order is not required to contain a "partic-
ular description of the type of communication sought to be inter-
cepted.''380 The West German statute also contains nothing akin to
the Title III minimization provision. Nor does it contain an exclu-
sionary rule for the fruits of wiretapping conducted in violation of
the statute, although at least one commentator has theorized that
suppression might result in at least some circumstances." 1
Like each of the other statutes examined, West Germany's wire-
tapping law contains an emergency surveillance provision. "In the
3n Id.
-" Professor Can reports that a wiretap order cannot be issued unless a formal
investigative proceeding directed by a prosecutor and supervised by a judge, roughly
similar to a grand jury proceeding, has been commenced. Car, supra note 366,
at 622.
- STPO § lOOa (final clause) (1968).
76 Car, supra note 366, at 625.
m See supra notes 331-35 and accompanying text.
r STPO § 101(I) (1968).
Id. § lOOb(ID.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(l)(b)(iii) (Supp. IV 1986).
" See Carr, supra note 366, at 639-43.
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case of apprehended danger ... the public prosecutor may issue"
an interception order.3 2 "An order issued by a public prosecutor
shall be inoperative unless it is confirmed by a judge within three
days. "383
D. Comparison
It is clear that Title III, even with the roving intercept provision,
is by far the most restrictive and demanding of the statutes ex-
amined. This should be cause for neither surprise nor dismay. More
than any other society, we cherish individual dignity, liberty and
privacy, particularly as against state action. No dramatic conclu-
sions are offered as a result of this brief survey. It was offered to
establish a context in which Title III and the emergency and roving
intercept provisions can be assessed.
VI. EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION
When Congress enacted Title III, it established an elaborate set
of procedures that must be followed before law enforcement offi-
cials are permitted to wiretap or eavesdrop. The statute was de-
signed to strike a balance between the need to combat crime, and
the protection of individual privacy. Overall, the legislation has
achieved its purpose.
At times, however, situations arise in which the elaborate pro-
cedures necessary to obtain a court order cannot be completed in
time for investigators to act effectively. Congress has addressed this
need on three separate occasions. Title III, as enacted in 1968,384
included a provision crafted to permit a prompt response to emer-
gency situations involving "conspiratorial activities characteristic of
organized crime," while preserving the essential protections of pre-
interception review by an authoritative law enforcement official and
timely judicial review. 385 In 1984, Congress amended the provision
to explicitly permit its use in life-threatening situations.8 6 In 1986,
"2 STPO § 100(b)(I) (1968).
383 Id.
3, Title III, supra note 6.
385 See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7) (Supp. IV 1986). The judicial review in such a
case occurs after the surveillance.
3" Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1203(a),
98 Stat. 1837, 2152.
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Congress added 18 U.S.C. § 2518(11), the "roving intercept" pro-
vision.3 When its special requirements are satisfied, the provision
permits investigators3 8 to obtain a court order authorizing them,
in the case of a wiretap, to intercept a specified person's telephone
conversations over any phone he happens to use, or, in the case
of a bug, to intercept the specified person's oral conversations in
any location where those conversations occur.
A. Evaluation
Do these provisions afford investigators with sufficient flexibility?
Do they adequately safeguard individual privacy? What alternatives
are worth considering?
1. The emergency surveillance provision. The emergency sur-
veillance provision essentially provides that when a situation exists
that involves "immediate danger of death or serious physical injury
to any person," or "conspiratorial activities characteristic of or-
ganized crime," certain top Justice Department officials may au-
thorize an investigator to intercept communications without a court
order. 89 An application for a retroactive order of approval must
be submitted to a judge within forty-eight hours of the commence-
ment of interception. 390
This provision has been used only in life-threatening situations,
and never in a more traditionally investigative, evidence-gathering
context. 391 There are several reasons. First, section 2518(7) is based
on an exigent circumstances doctrine that even now, two decades
after the enactment of Title III, provides only vague guidelines as
to when such surveillance would be constitutional.:9 Second, the
37 ECPA, supra note 17.
38 Although Title III directly regulates only federal officials, states are au-
thorized to pass similar legislation. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2) (Supp. IV 1986). The
ECPA, supra note 17, of which the roving interception provision is a part, con-
tains a provision authorizing states to conform their laws with ECPA. ECPA,
Pub. L. No. 99-508 § 111(b), 100 Stat. 1848, 1859 (1986). See also S. REP. No.
541, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 35, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADw.
NEws 3555, 3589; H.R. REP. No. 647, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 61-62 (1986).
3- 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7) (Supp. IV 1986). For the full text of this section, see
supra note 161.
390 Id.
391 See supra note 172.
39 See supra notes 32-59 and accompanying text.
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provision itself is so ambiguous that it is difficult for even the
most conscientious investigators, attorneys and judges to know when
emergency surveillance would be lawful 93 Third, the Justice De-
partment has an institutional bias against approving the interception
of communications until the factual and legal justification has been
reduced to writing.394 Moreover, the attorneys with primary respon-
sibility to evaluate Title III applications insist that when circum-
stances are truly exigent, they can process an application within
hours, thereby largely eliminating the need to conduct interceptions
prior to obtaining judicial authorization.3 95
There is no objective way to evaluate this assertion, or the re-
lated claim that true "emergencies" (except in the life-threatening
context) simply do not occur.3 96 I can only offer my own conced-
edly subjective' 97 impression that, when it comes to using Title III,
federal policy resembles traditional Russian military strategy: offen-
sive action is taken only after ponderous planning, preparation,
and review up through the hierarchy. Hasty mistakes are avoided,
but opportunities to seize the initiative and act quickly are forfeited
as a result. Perhaps this is as it should be, but perhaps a better
balance could be struck.
Remedial legislation could clarify some of the uncertainties that
exist with the emergency provision. The simplest alternative would
"I See supra notes 172-75 and accompanying text.
39 See supra notes 205-09 and accompanying text.
M" See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
-9 See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
197 During 1969-77, while serving as an Assistant District Attorney in the New
York County District Attorney's Office and New York City's Special Narcotics
Prosecutor's Office, I personally drafted and supervised the execution of some 35
wiretapping and eavesdropping warrants issued pursuant to New York's statute,
N.Y. CRI11. PROC. LAW §§ 700.05-.70 (McKinney 1984), and oversaw the drafting
and execution of several dozen others handled by other prosecutors in those
offices. In roughly half of those cases, the officials who sought my assistance
were federal agents. They preferred to work with me, and other state prosecutors,
rather than go to the United States Attorney's Office, because we were able to
obtain a court order in less than half the time that it took federal prosecutors.
No order obtained under my direct or indirect supervision was ever successfully
challenged. On only one occasion was evidence derived from such an order sup-
pressed.
The New York statute contained no emergency surveillance provision. I can
recall at least half a dozen occasions when I would have sought authority for
such surveillance had it been legally available.
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be to modify the "organized crime" language of section
2518(7)(a)(iii), perhaps by eliminating the "organized crime" re-
quirement altogether,395 to afford the Attorney General with broader
discretion in deciding whether to invoke it.399 To my knowledge,
however, the Justice Department has never sought such a change. °
Given the Justice Department's historic reluctance to use the emer-
gency provision, it is unlikely that such an amendment would result
in a greater willingness to invoke it.
2. Decentralization of the application and authorization process.
A second alternative, involving a somewhat greater revision in Title
III procedures, is to permit the Attorney General to decentralize
the application authorization process somewhat. Currently, before
a government investigator may apply to a judge for an interception
order, he or she must be authorized to do so by the Attorney
General, Deputy Attorney General, Associate Attorney General, or
an Assistant Attorney General specially designated by the Attorney
General. 401 In 1976, the National Wiretap Commission recom-
mended that Congress amend this provision to permit the Attorney
General to specially designate United States Attorneys and Federal
Strike Force Attorneys as authorizing officials. "0 In essence, such
391I concede the irony of suggesting that a statute can be made a more
effective weapon against organized crime by eliminating the reference to organized
crime.
3" If such an amendment were enacted, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7)(a)(iii) might read
"other criminal conduct that is particularly serious in nature and scope," rather
than "conspirational activities characteristic of organized crime." See supra note
161 for the full text of section 2518(7).
The Department did, by contrast, actively seek an immediate danger clause,
see supra note 168, and in 1986 sought passage of the roving interception clause,
see supra note 336.
S1 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
41 NWC REPoRT, supra note 6, at 7, 10 (1976). At the time, the application
review process in Washington apparently took somewhat longer than it does now:
the Commission reported that "most reviews take ten to fifteen days in Wash-
ington," id. at 58-59, although elsewhere in the Report it observed that "[tihe
procedure now usually takes three to five days in Washington," id. at 7. The
Report offered no explanation for the apparent conflict in its statistics. At the
time, 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) permitted only the Attorney General and specially
designated assistant attorneys general to authorize applications. The addition of
the Deputy Attorney General, Associate Attorney General, and specially designated
acting Assistant Attorneys General and Deputy Assistant Attorneys General in the
Criminal Division to the list of officials empowered to authorize applications
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an amendment would allow, but not require, the Attorney General
to empower specially designated United States and Strike Force
Attorneys to submit a Title III application directly to a federal
judge without first submitting the application to Washington for
approval.
Such an amendment would constitute a far more substantial
change to Title III than would occur if the emergency provision
itself is amended. Yet there is considerable logic to this suggestion,
particularly if one assumes that the Attorney General would spe-
cially designate only those United States and Strike Force Attorneys
who are experienced in applying Title III and are knowledgeable
about Justice Department policies governing wiretapping and eaves-
dropping.403 If the investigative agency also empowered its special
agent in charge of the agency field office to approve the agency's
participation in the investigation, without requiring referral to the
agency's headquarters in Washington, such a measure would reduce
the application review process by about a week. 404
There are valid arguments against decentralization. Decentraliza-
tion of the authority to authorize applications might result in de-
viations from overall Department policy regarding when and how
Title III should be used. Eliminating Justice Department review of
some Title III applications might increase the risk that a statutorily
inadequate application will be submitted to, and approved by, a
probably speeds the application process somewhat. According to knowledgeable
Justice Department spokesmen, however, the authorizing official who reviews the
application, usually the Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division, is
able to do so within a day or so, certainly not an unreasonable amount of time.
The review process takes as long as it does because of the complexity of the
matter being reviewed, not because of a logjam when the application reaches the
authorizing official.
401 Congress restricted the list of officials who could authorize an application
for two main reasons: it sought to assure that policies governing Title III would
be determined centrally, and that the decision to employ the statute in any given
case would be made by an official who was "subject to the political process."
S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 97, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONO.
& AnzmNS. NEws 2112, 2185. Because United States Attorneys, like the Attorney
General and the Deputy, Associate, and Assistant Attorneys General, are "subject
to the political process," the amendment to Title III suggested by the National
Wiretap Commission would not undermine Congress' second reason for restricting
the list of authorizing officials.
,4 See supra text following note 193.
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judge, resulting in wasted time and energy, unlawful invasion of
privacy, and perhaps civil litigation.4a5 Even so, selective decentral-
ization would add considerable flexibility without seriously jeopar-
dizing the balance that Congress sought and achieved. The Justice
Department, however, opposes decentralization, and until its atti-
tude changes, it is doubtful that Congress will enact the necessary
legislation.
3. The roving intercept provision. The roving intercept
provision4 provides that, if authorized by someone in the top
echelon of the Justice Department, a federal law enforcement of-
ficial may seek a court order, targeted against a specified individ-
ual, that authorizes investigators to tap or bug all of that person's
conversations, over any phone or at any location. The provision is
consistent wvith the overall structure of Title III and the balance
that statute creates between efficient law enforcement and respect
for privacy. It preserves the basic rule that there should be no
interception of communications without a court order. It is also
consistent with the Justice Department's insistence that a properly
drafted, written application is an absolute prerequisite for Depart-
ment approval of the use of Title III.0
The roving intercept provision appears to cut through many of
the difficulties that flow from centralization of the application
process and from the Justice Department's reluctance to invoke the
emergency provision. It permits prompt, decentralized response to
day-to-day developments: prompt, because the statute does not re-
quire a new court order before investigators may electronically
18 U.S.C. § 2520 (Supp. IV 1986) provides that "any person whose wire,
oral or electronic communication is intercepted ... in violation of this chapter"
may bring a civil action against anyone involved in the violation. 18 U.S.C. §
2518(7) (Supp. IV 1986), the emergency surveillance provision, provides that should
a judge refuse to issue an after-the-fact order approving the surveillance, "the
contents of any wire or oral communication intercepted shall be treated as having
been obtained in violation of this chapter." Although a good-faith belief that the
surveillance was lawful would constitute a defense to a civil action, 18 U.S.C. §
2520(d) (Supp. IV 1986), being required to establish good faith would likely prove
expensive, time-consuming and awkward, and could embarrass or endanger those
who provided investigators with the information that had prompted them to con-
duct the surveillance in the first place.
18 U.S.C. § 2518(11) (Supp. IV 1986).
See supra notes 205-07 and accompanying text. The only exception is in
life-threatening situations.
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"follow" a suspect to a new phone or location; decentralized, be-
cause the statute requires Justice Department approval of the orig-
inal application, but does not require the field supervisors to obtain
subsequent approval of Department officials in Washington before
"roving" to a new phone, facility or location.
Although there are areas of uncertainty at the margins ,411 the
roving intercept provision is basically straightforward. Unlike the
"organized crime" clause of the emergency surveillance provision,
the roving intercept provision is not flawed by a vague, ill-defined
term at its very core. The provision takes an inventive approach
to the Fourth Amendment particularity requirement, thereby raising
some apprehension about the provision's constitutionality. 409 These
doubts will in all likelihood be resolved in the provision's favor,
but only if the provision is used by the Justice Department and
tested in the courts. Justice Department officials were aware of the
constitutional issue when they negotiated with Congress for the
inclusion of the provision in the Electronic Communications Pri-
vacy Act. 410 It would be unfortunate indeed if an excess of caution
prevents the Department from the judicious use of the provision.
B. Conclusion
Crime, particularly organized crime, poses a significant threat to
the health, safety, and economic well-being of the nation and its
citizens. Electronic surveillance is an important weapon in the ar-
senal against organized crime, and the Justice Department has con-
ducted such surveillance pursuant to Title III effectively and with
admirable regard for individual privacy. Developments in commu-
nications technology, however, make it easier than ever for disci-
plined, sophisticated criminals to maintain contact with one another
while staying several steps ahead of investigators obliged to adhere
to the standard Title III application process.
Although since its enactment Title III has contained a provision
intended to permit investigators to respond to exigent circum-
stances, it has, for a variety of reasons, gone virtually unused. The
government's response to emergencies and fast-breaking develop-
- See supra notes 226-42 and accompanying text.
40 See supra notes 284-307 and accompanying text.
41 See supra note 336 and accompanying text.
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ments has also been slowed by the statutory requirement that a top
Justice Department official authorize all Title III applications.
The roving intercept provision, added in 1986, constitutes a novel
and ingenious attempt to enhance the speed and flexibility with
which investigators can respond to fast-breaking developments. At
the same time, it retains the basic safeguards that prevent unnec-
essary intrusions into individual privacy. While the roving intercept
provision does not solve all potential problems, it can be a signif-
icant tool for law enforcement-if the Justice Department permits
its investigators and prosecutors to use it.

